Encryption model & independent audits
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The Identity Engineer
Named algorithms and full key-derivation parameters (AES256-CBC-HMAC, Argon2d with iterations and memory cost) plus a separate 40-byte device key requiring explicit user verification are published, and annual independent penetration testing with results shared through a public Trust Center, alongside a rewarded bug bounty under a CISA-aligned disclosure policy, reaches well above the middle band. We found no public information on which fields stay unencrypted, any ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certification with its date, disclosed incident history, or reviewable open-source clients, and the captured pages give different names for the bug-bounty platform (HackerOne and Intigriti). 6 7 4