Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Sinew Software Systems Pvt. Ltd. · www.enpass.io

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Enpass at a glance

Vendor
Sinew Software Systems Pvt. Ltd.
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Enpass 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Enpass is a password and passkey manager whose business vaults live in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, or on their own devices. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 11 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 11 Nov 2026. all sources

Enpass alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The panel's verdict

Enpass is a password and passkey manager whose business vaults live in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, or on their own devices. Audit and policy is the strongest result, scores clustering at 7: granular event logs are retained up to 90 days and forwarded to Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic, Graylog or any JSON webhook. Sharing and access control scores 6 to 7 on four roles, including an Autofill Only role that hides passwords while the browser fills them. Sovereignty is weakest at 2 to 3 — the contracting entity is Enpass Technologies Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware under Delaware law, and we found no public information on a DPA, subprocessors, or Enpass Hub's hosting location. Deployment and portability splits 4 to 6, higher scores crediting vaults in customer-owned storage while the lowest weighs non-transferable passkeys and no documented self-hosting. Security architecture scores 5 to 6, naming 256-bit AES, SQLCipher and 320,000 PBKDF2 rounds, and we found no public information on published audit reports behind the ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II claims.

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Speaks for it

  • Business vaults live inside the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, or exclusively on their own devices via Wi-Fi and Folder Sync, keeping the vendor's hosting out of the data path
  • Sharing offers four roles down to an Autofill Only role that hides password fields while the browser extension still fills credentials
  • Event logs record actor, component, IP address and activity across the app, hub and admin console, retained up to 90 days and forwardable to Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic, Graylog or any JSON webhook, with a live dashboard of weak and compromised passwords
  • SCIM 2.0 provisioning with Microsoft Entra ID automates user creation, license assignment and user removal, and revoking the underlying storage permission removes vault access regardless of Enpass role
  • The security pages name 256-bit AES through the peer-reviewed, open-source SQLCipher engine with 320,000 rounds of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, and state the vendor holds no record of the master password or its derivative

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Held against it

  • The contracting entity is Enpass Technologies Inc. at 1201 N. Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware under Delaware law with binding arbitration in Wilmington, and we found no public information on a published data processing agreement, a subprocessor list, or where Enpass Hub, the Admin Console and the retained event logs are hosted
  • ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are claimed by name, and we found no public information on published audit reports or dates, a bug bounty, or incident history
  • We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released when single sign-on unlocks the account, or on hardware-key or FIDO2 multi-factor options
  • Item-level events such as autofill, field reveals and copies are off by default, and policy enforcement is named without a documented list of enforceable policies
  • Passkeys are stated to be non-transferable between password managers by design, and we found no public information on a self-hosted option, a status page with incident history, or encrypted full-fidelity export covering attachments

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Best for

  • You want vault contents stored in your own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant, or exclusively on your own devices, rather than on vendor infrastructure
  • You already run Microsoft Entra ID and want SCIM 2.0 provisioning to automate user creation, license assignment, removal and offboarding
  • You need detailed audit logs flowing into an existing SIEM such as Microsoft Sentinel or Splunk — the strongest-scored area, with scores clustering at 7
  • Your team needs least-privilege internal sharing, including a role that hides passwords while still allowing browser autofill

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Avoid if

  • You must contract with a European entity or under EU law — the terms name Enpass Technologies Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, governed by Delaware law with binding arbitration in Wilmington
  • Your procurement requires published audit or penetration-test reports before signing — the pages carry ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II as named claims, and we found no public information on the reports behind them
  • You need to move passkeys to another password manager later — passkeys are stated to be non-transferable by design
  • Your organization runs neither Microsoft 365 nor Google Workspace — business vaults are created within that work storage, and access to shared vaults follows those storage permissions

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The scores

Panel median The median of the judges’ scores per criterion. Each label opens its reasoning below.

Encryption model & independent audits

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How this is scored

What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.

0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.

3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.

5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.

8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.

10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.

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The CISO

The security page and whitepaper name the cipher (256-bit AES through the open-source SQLCipher engine), the key derivation (320,000 rounds of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512), and state the vendor holds no master password or derived key; ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are named on the homepage. What I cannot find: the auditing firm's name or report dates, a bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted, and any written incident history. A documented design with named certifications, but not yet a verifiable one. 1 3 4

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The Identity Engineer

The security pages name the full cryptographic stack — 256-bit AES through the open-source SQLCipher engine, 320,000 rounds of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, a master-password-derived key the vendor says it never records — and ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are named alongside a published security whitepaper. We found no public information on which fields are or are not encrypted, on dated audit or penetration-test reports, on a bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, or on incident history, so this is a well-documented model without the recurring external verification I want to see. 1 3 4

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The Compliance Auditor

The security pages name 256-bit AES, 320,000 rounds of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 and the peer-reviewed open-source SQLCipher engine, and state that the vendor holds no record of the master password or its derivative; ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are named and a security whitepaper is offered. We found no public information on audit dates or published reports, a bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, incident history, or a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted, so the documented evidence reaches the certification-named level and not beyond. 1 3 4

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The SME Owner

The security pages name 256-bit AES with 320,000 rounds of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 on the peer-reviewed, open-source SQLCipher engine, and state there is no record of the master password or its derivative with the vendor; ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are claimed by name on the homepage. We found no public information on which fields are encrypted versus not, published audit reports or dates, a bug bounty, or past incident disclosures, so this sits above the whitepaper-and-certification level but well short of verifiable end to end. 1 3 4

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The DevOps Engineer

The security page names the exact stack I want verified — 256-bit AES, the open-source SQLCipher engine, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 at 320,000 rounds — and states plainly that no master password or its derivative is held by the vendor, with ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II named on the homepage. What I don't get is the evidence behind those certifications: we found no public information on published audit or penetration-test reports, a bug bounty, or a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted. 3 4 1

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The Skeptic

The security page names the cipher, the derivation (320,000 rounds of PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512) and the open-source SQLCipher engine, and states the key is derived from the master password with no copy retained by the vendor — but ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II are claimed with no published report, and we found no public information on a bug bounty, disclosed incident history, or which fields remain unencrypted. A certification name is not an audit result. 1 3 4

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Sharing, roles & recovery

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How this is scored

How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.

0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.

3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.

5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.

8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.

10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.

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The CISO

Shared vaults live in the organisation's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace storage with four named roles, including an Autofill-Only role that hides password fields, and a documented two-layer model — vault keys distributed via RSA-3072 through the hub, and access lost the moment the underlying storage permission is revoked. Access recovery and automatic data deletion on offboarding are confirmed, and recovery actions are logged. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, or delegated administration. 1 5 6 8 10

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The Identity Engineer

Vaults are shared with named roles — Read-Only, Write, Manager, and an Autofill-Only role that hides the password while still allowing autofill — and the key model is documented: vault keys are distributed by Enpass Hub using RSA-3072 and never in plaintext, with access falling away automatically when the underlying storage permission is revoked. Access recovery, recovery-request audit events and automatic data deletion on user offboarding are listed. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, or approval workflows for sensitive items. 1 5 6 10

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The Compliance Auditor

Shared vaults carry four documented roles — Read-Only, Write, Manager, and an Autofill Only role that hides password fields while allowing autofill — with vault keys distributed via RSA-3072 through Enpass Hub, access dying when the underlying storage permission is revoked, and offboarding with automatic data deletion plus a recovery request-and-approval flow documented. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, or delegated administration per team. 1 5 6 10

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The SME Owner

Shared business vaults live in our own OneDrive, SharePoint or Google Drive with four roles — Read-Only, Write, Manager, and an Autofill Only role that hides the password while the browser still fills it — and the pages document that revoking storage access kills vault access regardless of Enpass role, with vault keys distributed through the Hub using RSA-3072 so they never travel in plaintext. Offboarding carries automatic data deletion, organisation-issued credentials land in each user's Primary Vault, and recovery requests are logged; but the terms also state that a forgotten master password means all data is lost forever, and we found no public information on the recovery key model, emergency access, time-limited or one-time sharing with outside parties, or approval workflows. This is close to what my forty people need, with the recovery question still open on the pages we read. 1 2 5 6 10

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The DevOps Engineer

Vaults are shared through the company's own OneDrive, SharePoint or Google Drive with four documented roles — including an Autofill Only role that hides the password while still letting the extension fill it, exactly the least-privilege control I ask for — and vault keys move through Enpass Hub with RSA-3072 public-key wrapping rather than in plaintext. Access recovery, automatic data deletion on offboarding and recovery events in the log are documented; we found no public information on time-limited or one-time external sharing, emergency access, or approval workflows. 5 6 1 10

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The Skeptic

Vault sharing is documented to real granularity — Read-Only, Write, Manager, and an Autofill Only role that hides passwords while permitting browser autofill — with keys distributed through Enpass Hub via RSA-3072 and access lost when the underlying storage permission is revoked, plus automatic data deletion on offboarding. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, or the key model behind the advertised access recovery. 1 5 6

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SSO, directory sync & provisioning

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How this is scored

How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.

0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.

3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.

5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.

8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.

10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.

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The CISO

Single sign-on is confirmed with an Okta SAML setup guide, and provisioning is genuinely documented: SCIM 2.0 and Microsoft Entra ID automate user creation, license assignment and user removal, with provisioned users and groups appearing in the admin console. Passkeys and biometric unlock are confirmed. We found no public information on hardware-key or FIDO2 authentication, or on how the vault key is derived or released behind an SSO unlock. 1 7 8 10

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The Identity Engineer

SCIM 2.0 is documented with an Entra ID connection that automates user creation, licence assignment and user removal, and because a recipient's access always follows the underlying storage permissions, disabling the account pulls the storage grant and therefore the vault — close to the instant leaver suspension I run, with the wrinkle that administrator accounts must be removed from the Admin Console manually before Entra ID deprovisioning takes them. SSO has a dedicated Okta SAML setup page and passkeys are supported with their creation and use logged. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released behind an SSO unlock, on FIDO2 or hardware-key MFA for the vault itself, or on conditional access and device policies. 1 6 7 8 10

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The Compliance Auditor

SSO setup with Okta SAML and Entra ID provisioning are documented, with SCIM 2.0 automating user creation, license assignment and user removal and provisioned users and groups appearing tagged in the Admin Console; passkeys are supported and their creation and use is logged. We found no public information on MFA options including hardware keys or on how the vault key is derived or released at an SSO unlock, and administrator accounts must be removed manually in the console before Entra ID deprovisioning — a leaver gap I would flag in an ISO 27001 review. 1 7 8

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The SME Owner

Single sign-on is offered with a published setup guide for Okta SAML, and SCIM 2.0 plus Entra ID automate user creation, licence assignment and user removal, with users and groups synced into the Admin Console. The pages state two quirks I would plan for: provisioned users cannot be removed manually from the Admin Console, and administrator accounts must be removed manually before Entra ID deprovisioning. We found no public information on hardware-key or FIDO2 multi-factor options or on how the vault key is derived or released behind a single sign-on unlock. 1 7 8

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The DevOps Engineer

SCIM 2.0 with Microsoft Entra ID automates user creation, licence assignment and removal, an Okta SAML setup page exists, and passkeys and biometric unlock are supported. The documentation stops before the part I care about: we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released behind an SSO unlock, on conditional access or device policies, or on group sync driving vault permissions. 1 7 8 2

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The Skeptic

Single sign-on is offered with a setup guide for Okta SAML, and SCIM 2.0 with Microsoft Entra ID automates user creation, license assignment and user removal. We found no public information on hardware-key or FIDO2 multi-factor options, and the captured pages do not document how the vault key is derived or released when SSO unlocks the account — the first question a buyer should ask. 1 7 8

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Audit logs, policies & reporting

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How this is scored

What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.

0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.

3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.

5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.

8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.

10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.

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The CISO

The logging model is unusually concrete: five fields per event, categories from sign-ins and sharing to recovery and organisation changes, retention stated at up to 90 days, a live security dashboard for weak and compromised passwords, and forwarding to named SIEM targets — Sentinel, Splunk, QRadar, Sumo Logic, Graylog or any JSON webhook — each with its connection method documented and the integration included in the business plan. My reservations: item-level events such as autofill, field reveals and copies are off by default, and policy enforcement is claimed as a bullet with no named policy behind it. 1 9 10

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The Identity Engineer

The Admin Console records a detailed trail — sign-ins, failed attempts, new devices, master password changes, sharing, recovery, policy and SSO or SCIM configuration events, plus item-level autofill, field reveals and copies, though item logging is off by default — with actor, component and IP per event and a stated 90-day retention. Logs flow natively to named targets including Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic and Graylog plus any JSON webhook, and a dashboard reports weak or compromised credentials. Policy enforcement is named without the individual policies being specified, and we found no public information on tamper-evidence, configurable retention beyond 90 days, or an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets. 1 9 10

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The Compliance Auditor

Event logs record actor, component, IP address and activity across sign-ins and failed attempts, sharing and permission revocations, policy and SSO/SCIM changes, recovery requests and export/import actions, retained up to 90 days with forwarding configured from the Admin Console to Sentinel, Splunk, QRadar, Sumo Logic, Graylog or any JSON webhook, plus a live dashboard of weak and compromised passwords. The events I need most for an auditor's question — field reveals and copies — are logged only when enabled and are off by default, and we found no public information on tamper-evident logs, alerting, or an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets. 1 9 10

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The SME Owner

The Admin Console records who did what, when and from which IP across the app, the Hub and the console, covering sign-ins, sharing, vault and organisation changes, recovery requests, and item-level events like autofill and field copies (off by default), retained up to 90 days with forwarding to Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic, Graylog or any JSON webhook. A live security dashboard flags weak and compromised passwords, which is the health reporting I want. Policy enforcement is listed as a business feature but its specifics, log export outside SIEM forwarding, and reporting aligned to NIS2 or IT-Grundschutz are not described beyond the ISO 27001:2022 certification claim. 1 9 10

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The DevOps Engineer

The Admin Console records sign-ins, sharing, policy and recovery events with actor, component and IP address, item-level events like autofill and field copies exist but are off by default, retention is stated at up to 90 days, and logs forward natively to Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic and Graylog or any JSON webhook — plus a live dashboard for weak and compromised passwords. Policy enforcement is claimed as a feature without an itemised policy list, and we found no public information on tamper-evidence, configurable retention, or an auditor role separate from secret access. 9 10 1

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The Skeptic

Event logging is genuinely granular — sign-ins, failed attempts, new devices, sharing, exports, vault password changes, and item-level autofill and field reveals and copies — exportable to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic, Graylog, plus a JSON webhook), with 90-day retention stated and a live weak-or-compromised-password dashboard. But item events are off by default, policy enforcement is named without a documented list of enforceable policies, and we found no public information on tamper-evidence or an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets. 1 9 10

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Hosting choice, offline access & export

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How this is scored

Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.

0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.

3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.

8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.

10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.

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The CISO

The architecture puts vault contents in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, and Wi-Fi and Folder Sync keep encrypted data exclusively on the user's own devices — resilience to a vendor outage by construction. Export exists as JSON with optional trash and archive items, but the import guidance tells users to delete the unencrypted files afterwards, passkeys are not transferable, and we found no public information on a self-hosted option, a status page, or an encrypted full-fidelity export of every item type. 1 5 10 11 12

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The Identity Engineer

The vaults never sit on vendor infrastructure: business vaults live in the organisation's own OneDrive, SharePoint or Google Drive, and Wi-Fi or Folder Sync can keep encrypted data exclusively on the local hard drive, which puts data location on the customer's terms; mobile, web and desktop apps are named in the terms. Export to.json with optional Trash and Archive inclusion, and import or restore from backup, are documented, though passkeys are not transferable, and we found no public information on encrypted full-fidelity export, attachments, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, or explicit continuity during a vendor-service outage. 2 5 11 12

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The Compliance Auditor

Vault storage sits in the organization's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant, and fully offline operation is documented through Wi-Fi and Folder Sync keeping encrypted data solely on the customer's own devices; export to.json with optional Trash and Archive items, import, and restore from a previous backup or export are documented. We found no public information on an itemized client list per operating system and browser, a status page with incident history, or export fidelity for attachments — and passkeys are stated to be non-transferable by design. 5 10 11 12

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The SME Owner

The vaults themselves stay inside our own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, and Wi-Fi or Folder Sync keeps encrypted data exclusively on our own devices with fully offline sync, so the storage path is our tenant and our kit, not a vendor region. Export to.json from the File menu with optional Trash and Archive contents, plus restore from a previous backup, is documented, though the pages state passkeys cannot be transferred between password managers. We found no public information on a self-hosted option, a status page with incident history, Linux clients, or an encrypted full-fidelity export covering attachments. 5 10 11 12

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The DevOps Engineer

I like the shape of this: vaults stay inside the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant, can be stored exclusively on your own devices with Wi-Fi and folder sync to a local folder, and export is documented as.json from the File menu with optional Trash and Archive items plus restore from a previous backup. But the Hub and Admin Console remain vendor-run services — we found no public information on a self-hosted deployment with backup or high availability, and the vendor instead markets "no self-hosting hassle" — while no status page, Linux client or attachment export is documented, and passkeys are not exportable by design. 1 5 10 11 12

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The Skeptic

Vaults sit in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, or exclusively on the customer's own devices via Wi-Fi and Folder Sync, which takes the vendor's hosting out of the data path, and a JSON export including optional Trash and Archive items is documented. Passkeys are stated as not transferable out of the product by design, and we found no public information on client coverage by platform, a status page with incident history, or import from competing password managers. 1 10 11 12

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European sovereignty panel opinion

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How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.

0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.

3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.

5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.

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The CISO

The contracting and copyright entity is Enpass Technologies Inc. of 1201 N. Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware, governed by Delaware law with binding arbitration in Wilmington; no European entity or representative appears in the captured pages. GDPR compliance is claimed and vault contents sit in the customer's own cloud tenant rather than vendor infrastructure, which narrows what a foreign authority could seize from the vendor, but we found no published data-processing agreement, no subprocessor list with locations, and no statement of where the hub, admin console and event logs are processed. 1 2 5 10

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The Identity Engineer

The contracting entity is proven non-European — Enpass Technologies Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, under Delaware governing law with arbitration in Wilmington — and we found no public information on a published DPA, a subprocessor list, or where Enpass Hub, the Admin Console and the retained event logs are hosted. The one element in the customer's hands is that vault contents stay inside the organisation's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant, or on the local disk, so the file data follows the customer's region even though the vendor-side chain does not. 2 5 9 11

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The Compliance Auditor

The contracting entity is Enpass Technologies Inc. of 1201 N. Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware, under Delaware governing law with arbitration in Wilmington — and we found no public information on an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a published DPA, or a subprocessor list, only a bare "GDPR Compliant" claim. Vault contents stay in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, which follows the customer's tenant, but where the Enpass Hub, the Admin Console and its 90-day event logs are hosted is not stated anywhere I read. 1 2 5 10

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The SME Owner

The contracting entity is Enpass Technologies Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware under Delaware law with arbitration in Wilmington, and we found no public information on a published data processing agreement, subprocessors or their locations, or where the Hub, metadata and the up-to-90-day event logs are hosted. The genuine mitigation is that vault contents sit in our own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant rather than a vendor-chosen region, but the Hub that distributes vault keys is vendor infrastructure whose location the captured pages do not state. 1 2 6 10

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The DevOps Engineer

The chain that is visible runs through the United States: Enpass Technologies Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, with Delaware governing law and arbitration seated in Wilmington. The vault data path is the redeeming part — it sits in the customer's own tenant or exclusively on the customer's own devices — but we found no public information on a published DPA, subprocessor locations, or an EU representative. 2 1 5 11

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The Skeptic

The contracting entity is Enpass Technologies Inc. at 1201 N. Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware, under Delaware law with arbitration in Wilmington, and we found no public information on a published DPA, subprocessor locations, or where Enpass Hub and its up-to-90-day event logs are hosted. Storing vaults in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace is a real decoupling, but that chain runs through US hyperscalers and the customer's own tenant rather than any stated European region. 1 2 6 10

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

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How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.

5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.

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The CISO

The business plan is priced publicly at 1,98 € per user per month billed yearly with taxes applied at checkout, a free trial is offered, and the feature set — SSO, SCIM, SIEM included, administrative controls — is listed alongside; the 30-day refund and price-change terms are written down. The enterprise tier is quoted only as 'Volume, multi-year and site based pricing', the personal Lite, Pro and Premium licences carry no prices on the captured pages, and seat minimums and minimum term are unstated. A buyer can price the business tier but not the whole catalogue. 1 2 10

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The Identity Engineer

The Business plan is publicly priced at 1,98 € per user per month, billed yearly, with taxes applied at checkout, a free trial, and the main inclusions listed — SSO, SCIM provisioning and SIEM integration are included in that plan. Enterprise is "Volume, multi-year and site based pricing" with custom commercial agreements, so a full annual cost for a large deployment is not computable from the captured pages, and we found no public information on seat minimums or a minimum term. 1 2

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The Compliance Auditor

The Business plan is published at "1,98 € /user/month billed yearly" with applicable taxes stated at checkout and its main features itemized, including that SIEM integration is included; the terms state a 30-day full refund for website purchases, automatic renewal, and fee changes at cycle end. Enterprise pricing is only "Volume, multi-year and site based pricing", and we found no public information on seat minimums, add-on prices, or prices for the personal Lite, Pro and Premium tiers. 1 2 10

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The SME Owner

One business plan is published at 1,98 € /user/month billed yearly with applicable taxes applied at checkout, and single sign-on, SCIM provisioning, SIEM integration, access recovery and unlimited vaults all sit on that single tier rather than being pushed upmarket — with a free trial and a 30-day full refund for website purchases. Enterprise is custom ('Volume, multi-year and site based pricing') and the personal Lite, Pro and Premium licences are not priced on the pages we read. We found no public information on seat minimums or add-on pricing. 1 2 10

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The DevOps Engineer

The Business plan is public at "1,98 € /user/month billed yearly" with taxes applied at checkout, SIEM included in that plan, a free trial, and honest small print — a 30-day full refund on website purchases, no pro-rata after that, and auto-renewal and fee-change terms stated. Enterprise is a sales conversation ("Volume, multi-year and site based pricing"), and we found no public prices for the Lite, Pro and Premium personal licences, nor seat minimums. 1 2 10

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The Skeptic

The Business plan is publicly priced at 1,98 € /user/month billed yearly with applicable taxes at checkout, its feature list is published including that SIEM integration is included, and a 30-day refund for website purchases plus renewal and price-change terms are stated. We found no public information on seat minimums or prices for the personal Lite, Pro and Premium licences, and enterprise buyers are offered only 'Volume, multi-year and site based pricing'. 1 2 10

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined — uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Enpass

Is Enpass European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Enpass is based.

Where does Enpass store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026.

Does Enpass have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Enpass?

As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Enpass alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (12)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Terms of service — found from the homepage www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →