Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: not determined

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Sinew Software Systems Pvt. Ltd. · www.enpass.io

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Enpass at a glance

Vendor
Sinew Software Systems Pvt. Ltd.
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Enpass 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Enpass is a password and passkey manager whose business vaults live in the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace environment, or on their own devices. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 11 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 11 Nov 2026. all sources

Enpass alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The DevOps Engineer

Weighted verdict

Would rather run the vault in the company's own data centre than trust another SaaS with root credentials. Wants a documented self-hosted deployment with backup and high availability, open-source code to read, a CLI and API for pipelines, and an export that loses nothing.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The DevOps Engineer

Panel median The DevOps Engineer This judge’s scores over the panel median. Each label opens its reasoning below.
Scores per criterion, in stars out of 5
Criterion Panel median The DevOps Engineer
Encryption model & independent audits 2.5 of 5 2.5 of 5
Sharing, roles & recovery 3 of 5 3 of 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning 3 of 5 3 of 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export 3 of 5 3 of 5
European sovereignty 1 of 5 1.5 of 5

Encryption model & independent audits

How this is scored

What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.

0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.

3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.

5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.

8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.

10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.

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The DevOps Engineer

The security page names the exact stack I want verified — 256-bit AES, the open-source SQLCipher engine, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 at 320,000 rounds — and states plainly that no master password or its derivative is held by the vendor, with ISO 27001:2022 and SOC 2 Type II named on the homepage. What I don't get is the evidence behind those certifications: we found no public information on published audit or penetration-test reports, a bug bounty, or a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted. 3 4 1

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Sharing, roles & recovery

How this is scored

How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.

0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.

3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.

5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.

8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.

10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.

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The DevOps Engineer

Vaults are shared through the company's own OneDrive, SharePoint or Google Drive with four documented roles — including an Autofill Only role that hides the password while still letting the extension fill it, exactly the least-privilege control I ask for — and vault keys move through Enpass Hub with RSA-3072 public-key wrapping rather than in plaintext. Access recovery, automatic data deletion on offboarding and recovery events in the log are documented; we found no public information on time-limited or one-time external sharing, emergency access, or approval workflows. 5 6 1 10

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SSO, directory sync & provisioning

How this is scored

How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.

0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.

3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.

5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.

8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.

10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.

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The DevOps Engineer

SCIM 2.0 with Microsoft Entra ID automates user creation, licence assignment and removal, an Okta SAML setup page exists, and passkeys and biometric unlock are supported. The documentation stops before the part I care about: we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released behind an SSO unlock, on conditional access or device policies, or on group sync driving vault permissions. 1 7 8 2

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Audit logs, policies & reporting

How this is scored

What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.

0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.

3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.

5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.

8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.

10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.

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The DevOps Engineer

The Admin Console records sign-ins, sharing, policy and recovery events with actor, component and IP address, item-level events like autofill and field copies exist but are off by default, retention is stated at up to 90 days, and logs forward natively to Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, IBM QRadar, Sumo Logic and Graylog or any JSON webhook — plus a live dashboard for weak and compromised passwords. Policy enforcement is claimed as a feature without an itemised policy list, and we found no public information on tamper-evidence, configurable retention, or an auditor role separate from secret access. 9 10 1

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Hosting choice, offline access & export

How this is scored

Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.

0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.

3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.

8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.

10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.

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The DevOps Engineer

I like the shape of this: vaults stay inside the customer's own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant, can be stored exclusively on your own devices with Wi-Fi and folder sync to a local folder, and export is documented as.json from the File menu with optional Trash and Archive items plus restore from a previous backup. But the Hub and Admin Console remain vendor-run services — we found no public information on a self-hosted deployment with backup or high availability, and the vendor instead markets "no self-hosting hassle" — while no status page, Linux client or attachment export is documented, and passkeys are not exportable by design. 1 5 10 11 12

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European sovereignty

How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.

0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.

3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.

5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.

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The DevOps Engineer

The chain that is visible runs through the United States: Enpass Technologies Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, with Delaware governing law and arbitration seated in Wilmington. The vault data path is the redeeming part — it sits in the customer's own tenant or exclusively on the customer's own devices — but we found no public information on a published DPA, subprocessor locations, or an EU representative. 2 1 5 11

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Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.

5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.

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The DevOps Engineer

The Business plan is public at "1,98 € /user/month billed yearly" with taxes applied at checkout, SIEM included in that plan, a free trial, and honest small print — a 30-day full refund on website purchases, no pro-rata after that, and auto-renewal and fee-change terms stated. Enterprise is a sales conversation ("Volume, multi-year and site based pricing"), and we found no public prices for the Lite, Pro and Premium personal licences, nor seat minimums. 1 2 10

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European sovereignty — proven facts

0 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Not determined — uncited Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Enpass

Is Enpass European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Enpass is based.

Where does Enpass store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026.

Does Enpass have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 11 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Enpass?

As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Enpass alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (12)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Terms of service — found from the homepage www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap www.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →
  12. 12 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap help.enpass.io Checked 11 Nov 2026 Details →