Password Management
NordPass
Provenance unknown Report an error0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Nord Security Inc. · nordpass.com
Report an error on this page Is this your product? →
Link to this page
Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds.
The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where
that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.
NordPass at a glance
- Vendor
- Nord Security Inc.
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026
- Data hosting
- Default not stated; pages mention the US and the EU source, captured 1 Oct 2026
- Free plan
- Yes, per the vendor’s own page source, captured 1 Oct 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates NordPass 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. NordPass, Nord Security Inc.'s business password manager, scores strongest on operations and weakest on paperwork. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 1 Oct 2026 to 13 Oct 2026; evaluated by the panel 14 Oct 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
NordPass, Nord Security Inc.'s business password manager, scores strongest on operations and weakest on paperwork. Sharing and access control, identity integration, deployment and portability and security architecture hold at a flat 4, with audit and policy at 4 to 5. Those scores rest on published specifics: XChaCha20 with Argon2id derivation and X25519 key exchange, organization-level account recovery that reassigns a departed employee's items, provisioning with Entra ID and Okta, SSO with Google Workspace over OAuth 2.0, and clients for six platforms plus five browser extensions. Sovereignty is the weak column at 2 to 3 — vault items sit in AWS data centers across the US and EU, no captured page states where the contracting entity is incorporated, and subprocessors appear only as categories — and judges differ on how far that evidence goes. Pricing transparency follows at 1 to 2: no price figure appears on any captured page, and the enterprise route is a demo request. Judges split a point on whether the activity log, with no export or retention path shown, earns a 4 or a 5.
Speaks for it
- Published encryption design names XChaCha20 for vault contents, Argon2id key derivation with a 16-byte salt, and X25519 for key exchange.
- A departed employee's items stay with the organization and can be reassigned, with organization-level account recovery documented.
- Provisioning with Entra ID and Okta, SSO with Google Workspace, and OAuth 2.0 for business authentication are documented.
- Clients cover iOS, Android, Windows, macOS, Linux, the web vault and five browser extensions, with offline credential access listed.
- The 14-day business trial requires no credit card.
Held against it
- The captured pricing pages map six plan segments to features but show no price figure, seat minimum or add-on price.
- ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 certifications and the third-party audits appear without dates, auditor names or published reports.
- We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released when a user signs in with SSO.
- We found no public information on exporting the activity log to a SIEM, or on log retention periods.
- We found no statement of where the contracting entity is incorporated and no subprocessor list with locations.
Best for
- You need offboarding handled: a departed employee's items stay with the organization and can be reassigned.
- Your team already runs Entra ID or Okta and wants user and group provisioning with SSO.
- You want broad client coverage — six apps and five browser extensions — with offline credential access.
- You want to trial before committing, via a 14-day business trial that needs no credit card.
Avoid if
- You must compute an annual invoice from published per-user prices before talking to sales — the captured pricing pages show tiers and features but no figures.
- You require vault data confined to a single region — the captured pages describe storage in AWS data centers across the US and EU.
- Your compliance regime needs audit logs exportable to a SIEM with stated retention — we found no public information on either.
- Your procurement requires a named subprocessor list and a stated incorporation jurisdiction — the privacy policy names recipient categories only.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 2 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 2 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 2 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 2 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 1 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Security described in adjectives ("bank-grade", "military encryption") with no architecture, no audit and no statement of what the vendor can read.
3 — Encryption algorithms named and "zero knowledge" claimed, but no whitepaper, no statement of which fields stay unencrypted, and audits mentioned without dates, auditors or results.
5 — A published security whitepaper naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, a stated list of what is and is not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), and a named independent audit or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) with its date.
8 — Recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The security pages name the full cryptographic stack — XChaCha20, Argon2id with a 16-byte salt, X25519 for key exchange — and claim zero-knowledge, which is more than adjectives. But I found no whitepaper stating which fields stay unencrypted, the ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 certifications come with no auditor, date or report, and there is no documented incident history; the bug-bounty language is a sentence about white-hat hackers rather than a published program with a policy. 5 6
The Identity Engineer
The security page names real primitives — XChaCha20 for the vault, Argon2id key derivation with a salt, an X25519 asymmetric layer for key exchange — plus a zero-knowledge claim and ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 certifications, which is more than adjectives. But the audits and certifications carry no dates, auditors or published results, and we found no public information on which fields such as URLs or metadata remain unencrypted. 5 6
The Compliance Auditor
The security pages name the design concretely — XChaCha20 for vault contents, Argon2id derivation with a 16-byte salt, X25519 for key exchange, encryption on the device before upload — and claim zero-knowledge, which is more than adjectives. But ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 appear with no dates or scope, the "regular independent third-party security audits" come with no auditor, date or result, and I found no public statement of which fields such as URLs and metadata stay unencrypted. A mention of white-hat hackers hints at a bounty, though I found no public policy, incident history or reviewable client source. 3 5 6
The SME Owner
The security pages show real cryptography rather than adjectives: XChaCha20 with Argon2id key derivation, asymmetric keys for the exchange, and encryption on the device before upload. But audits are described only as regular independent third-party audits with no auditor, date or published result, a bug-hunting effort is alluded to only as employing white hat hackers, ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 are named without dates, and I found no public information on which fields such as URLs or metadata stay unencrypted. 5 6
The DevOps Engineer
The encryption design is written down in real detail — XChaCha20 for vault contents, Argon2id key derivation with a 16-byte salt, X25519 for key exchange — and ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 are named, which is well above adjective-level security. But the certifications carry no dates, and we found no public information on published audit reports, on which fields stay unencrypted, or on open-source clients I could review myself. 5 6
The Skeptic
The security page names real cryptography — XChaCha20 for vault contents, Argon2id with a 16-byte salt for key derivation, and an asymmetric layer for key exchange — so this is more than adjectives. But the audits are described as regular independent third-party security audits with no firm, no date and no report, the ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type 2 certifications appear without dates, and we found no public statement of which fields stay unencrypted and no documented incident history to test the zero-knowledge claim against. 5 6
Sharing, roles & recovery
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — Personal vaults only, or sharing by sending a password to another user with no permissions and no record.
3 — Shared folders with all-or-nothing access, no roles, and no stated process for recovering an account or reclaiming credentials from a departing employee.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with read, edit and manage permissions, groups and admin roles, an admin recovery mechanism documented with its key model, and offboarding that transfers a leaver's shared items.
8 — Granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
A Sharing Hub, organization-level account recovery and reassignment of a leaver's items to the organization are stated, which answers the offboarding question. What I cannot find is any granularity — read-only, time-limited or hide-the-password sharing — and the recovery mechanism is described without its key model, so I cannot say who holds what when an admin recovers an account. 1 2 4 5
The Identity Engineer
Sharing is run through a sharing hub with an owner role managing member permissions, organization account recovery, and — the part I care about — an employee's items stay with the organization and can be reassigned when they leave. We found no public information on read, edit and manage permission granularity, view-only or time-limited sharing, or the key model behind organization recovery, so I cannot tell what recovery exposes. 1 2 4 5
The Compliance Auditor
Sharing is organised: a Sharing Hub monitors all shared credentials, an owner role manages member permissions and organisation-wide settings, the organisation can recover employees' accounts, and a leaver's items stay with the company and are reassigned — my offboarding question is answered. What I cannot evidence is granularity or the key model: I found no public information on read-only versus edit rights, time-limited or one-time sharing, emergency access, or how organisation recovery works cryptographically. Departure is handled; least privilege is not demonstrated. 1 4 5
The SME Owner
This speaks straight to my pain points: the organization can recover an employee's forgotten account without any risk of losing data, and when someone leaves their items stay with the organization and can be reassigned, with a Sharing Hub to oversee shared logins and an owner role managing member permissions. I found no public information on read-versus-edit permission granularity, groups, or the key model behind that account recovery, so I can't tell how tightly sharing is actually governed. 5 1 4 2
The DevOps Engineer
Organization-level account recovery, items staying with the company and being reassignable when an employee leaves, a sharing hub, and an owner role that manages member permissions are all documented. We found no public information on granular roles such as view-only versus manage, time-limited sharing, emergency access, or the key model behind the account recovery, so I take the governance claims on faith rather than on paper. 1 2 4 5
The Skeptic
Organization-level account recovery and reassignment of a departed employee's items are documented, an owner role governs member lists and permissions, and a sharing hub centralizes shared credentials. What recovery means for the key model is not stated anywhere we could see, and we found no public information on granular read or edit permissions, view-only or time-limited sharing, or emergency access with a waiting period. 1 4 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — Each user creates an account by email; no SSO, no directory sync and no MFA beyond an app code.
3 — SSO available only to sign in to the admin console or on the top tier with no description of how the vault is then decrypted, and users provisioned by CSV invite.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) documented with how the vault key is derived or released, SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — SSO unlock designed so the vendor cannot derive the vault key and stated so, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SSO with Google Workspace and user-and-group provisioning with Entra ID and Okta are listed, and OAuth 2.0 is named as the business authentication backbone. The captured pages never say how the vault key is derived or released under SSO, and I found no public information on FIDO2 or hardware-key MFA or on what deprovisioning actually revokes. 1 2 5
The Identity Engineer
User and group provisioning with Entra ID and Okta is exactly what my leaver process needs, and SSO with Google Workspace over OAuth 2.0 is documented. But we found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at an SSO sign-in, whether deprovisioning suspends vault access immediately, or FIDO2 hardware keys for unlocking the vault — passkeys appear only as something the vault stores, not as a way to open it. 1 2 5
The Compliance Auditor
Named providers are documented: SSO login with Google Workspace, user and group provisioning with Entra ID and Okta, OAuth 2.0 as the business authorisation server, MFA protection and an integrated authenticator. But I found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released on the SSO path — the zero-knowledge statement is general — and none on FIDO2 or hardware keys, or on whether deprovisioning suspends vault access immediately. The identity plumbing is named; whether the vendor can derive the vault key under SSO is unanswered. 1 2 5
The SME Owner
User and Group Provisioning with Entra ID and Okta is listed on the pricing page, SSO with Google Workspace is included on Teams, OAuth 2.0 is named for business authentication, and MFA protection is a listed feature. I found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released during an SSO unlock, or on FIDO2 hardware keys — that is the part I would need spelled out before trusting SSO for forty people. 2 5 1
The DevOps Engineer
User and group provisioning with Entra ID and Okta, SSO login with Google Workspace, an OAuth 2.0 authorization server for business authentication, and MFA protection are all evidenced — that is a genuine identity stack, not a CSV invite. We found no public information on how the vault key is derived or released at an SSO unlock, on FIDO2 or hardware keys, or on what deprovisioning actually revokes, and for something holding root credentials I need that written down. 2 4 5
The Skeptic
SSO with Google Workspace appears in a tier feature table, user and group provisioning with Entra ID and Okta is published, and OAuth 2.0 is named as the business authentication protocol. No captured page describes how the vault key is derived or released when a user signs in with SSO — the classic place vendors quietly keep half the key — and we found no public information on hardware-key or FIDO2 authentication or passkey unlock of the vault itself. 1 2 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No audit log and no admin policies; the administrator sees a user list.
3 — A basic activity list and a password-strength score, but no exportable log, no enforceable policies, and no record of who viewed or copied a shared credential.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, exportable or available through an API, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Native SIEM integration with named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
Company-wide password rules, security settings applied to all users, an activity log with audit trails for every user action, password health and dark-web monitoring for company domains are all evidenced. I found no public information on exporting logs or feeding them to a SIEM, on log retention, or on reports an ISO 27001 auditor could take away. 1 2
The Identity Engineer
The activity log is described as tracking every user action with full transparency and detailed audit trails, company-wide password policies are customizable, security settings apply to all users, and password health plus a breach scanner for company domains are included. What I found no public information on is any export or SIEM path for those logs, or stated retention — the pieces an ISO 27001 auditor asks me for. 1 2
The Compliance Auditor
The administrator side exists: an activity log with audit trails claimed to cover "every action of a user", enterprise-wide password rules, security settings applied to all users, MFA protection, password health and a data breach scanner. For ISO 27001 or NIS2 evidence, though, I found no public information on exporting logs or feeding a SIEM, on retention periods, or on whether views and copies of a shared credential are recorded separately. As published, the log reads like a screen, not evidence an auditor can take away. 1 2
The SME Owner
There is an activity log promising to track every action of a user with detailed audit trails, plus company-wide customizable password rules, security settings applied to all users, password health and dark-web breach notifications for company domains. I found no public information on exporting the log, connecting it to a SIEM, or how long events are kept — exactly what an ISO auditor will eventually ask me to produce. 1 2 5
The DevOps Engineer
An activity log with audit trails for user actions, company-wide password rules, security settings applied to all users, password health and a data breach scanner for company domains are all on the pages. We found no public information on exporting logs or an API to them, SIEM targets, log retention, or policies for sharing and export, so an external auditor would get marketing summaries rather than evidence. 1 2
The Skeptic
An activity log with audit trails for user actions, enterprise-wide customizable password rules, user activity monitoring, password health and a breach scanner for company domains are all on the public pages. We found no public information on exporting the log or sending it to a SIEM, no stated retention period, and no enforceable policy for sharing or export — so what an ISO 27001 auditor could actually pull out is unproven. 1 2
Hosting choice, offline access & export
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Cloud only in an unstated region, no offline access, and no export or an export that drops attachments and shared items.
3 — Cloud with a region named, apps for common platforms, and an export in CSV only that leaves out attachments, folders, TOTP seeds or custom fields.
5 — An EU region or self-hosted option, offline read access on desktop and mobile, clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android and the major browsers, and an export that covers all item types including attachments.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, a status page with incident history, encrypted full-fidelity export and import from named competitors, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, the web vault and five browser extensions, offline credential access is listed, and vault items sit in AWS data centres across the US and EU. I found no public information on self-hosting, on whether an EU-only region can be selected, or on any export or import path — silence on the exit route is what worries me. 1 2 5
The Identity Engineer
Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, the web vault and the five major browsers, offline credential access is a listed feature, and vault items sit in AWS data centers across the US and EU. We found no public information on a self-hosted option or on export and import at all, which is what leaving the vendor on my own terms would depend on. 1 2 5
The Compliance Auditor
Clients cover the estate — Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, a web vault and five browser extensions — with offline credential access included and vault items hosted on AWS across US and EU data centers. I found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises option, a status page with incident history, or any documented export format, including whether attachments and structure survive an export. Presence is documented; the exit path, on the captured pages, is not. 1 2 5
The SME Owner
Vaults sit on AWS in US and EU data centers, offline credential access is a Teams feature, and clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, the web vault and five major browser extensions. But I found no public information on export or import — not even a format — and no public information on a self-hosted option, so I can't see how we would ever leave with our data intact. 5 2 1
The DevOps Engineer
Vault items in separate AWS data centers across the US and EU, offline credential access, and clients for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, Android, a web vault and five browsers are all documented — the client coverage is genuinely solid. But we found no public information on a self-hosted or on-premises deployment, on any documented export path including attachments, or on a status page, and a vault I cannot run in my own data centre and cannot provably leave does not pass my test. 1 2 5
The Skeptic
Vault items are stored in AWS data centers across the US and EU, offline credential access is a listed feature, and clients cover iOS, Android, Windows, macOS, Linux, the web vault and five browsers. We found no public information on a self-hosted option, a status page with incident history, or any documented export format — the only portability path we could find is a privacy-policy right to request a copy of personal data, which is a right, not an export. 1 2 3 5
European sovereignty
panel opinion
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Non-EU vendor and contracting entity, hosting unstated, and subprocessors unnamed.
3 — An EU data region offered while the contracting entity and parent are non-EU without a stated safeguard, or the subprocessor list is absent.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable and an EU contracting entity, but the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The captured pages never state where Nord Security Inc. is incorporated, ownership is unstated, and there is no subprocessor list, while vault items are stored in AWS data centres in both the US and the EU. The privacy policy names Google Analytics and sharing with service providers, Nord group companies and law enforcement, so the chain outside the vault is broad and undocumented. 1 3 5
The Identity Engineer
Vault items are described as stored across US and EU AWS data centers on a US provider, and the captured pages do not confirm where the contracting entity is incorporated or who owns it. Subprocessors appear only as categories in the privacy policy with no named list or locations, so the chain behind two thousand staff's vault metadata and logs is not visible to me. 1 3 4 5
The Compliance Auditor
Nord Security Inc. is the contracting party and controller, but I found no public information on where it is incorporated — the Vilnius group address is unconfirmed for this entity — so I cannot name the contracting entity's jurisdiction for an audit. Vaults sit on AWS in US and EU data centers, and the privacy policy names recipient categories and Google Analytics, but I found no public subprocessor list with locations. A data processing agreement is linked and incorporated into the terms — the one concrete safeguard — yet entity, ownership and the subprocessor chain remain unverified. 1 3 4 5
The SME Owner
Hosting is at least stated — AWS data centers across the US and EU — but the captured terms and privacy policy leave the contracting entity's jurisdiction and the group's ownership unstated, and subprocessors appear only as categories such as service providers and Nord group companies rather than a named list with locations. Website analytics run through Google Analytics, and I found no public information on a self-hosted deployment that would take the vendor out of the chain. 1 3 5
The DevOps Engineer
Nord Security is the named contracting party, but the captured terms and privacy policy do not state where it is incorporated, and vault items sit on AWS across the US and EU. We found no public information on a subprocessor list with locations — only categories such as service providers, Nord group companies and Google Analytics for website analytics — and with the legal entity, ownership and residency all unverifiable on the vendor's own pages, I treat this as US infrastructure with an EU option, not a European chain. 1 3 5
The Skeptic
Vault items sit on named AWS infrastructure across the US and EU, but everything around that chain is dark: the captured terms and privacy policy do not state where the contracting entity is incorporated, and ownership is unpublished. Subprocessors appear only as categories — service providers, partners, Nord group companies — alongside Google Analytics on the website, so who else touches account data and metadata is unevidenced. 1 3 5
Pricing transparency
Show reasoningHide reasoning
How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A starting price exists, but which business features (SSO, SCIM, audit logs) sit in which tier is unclear — the invoice is unknowable.
5 — Per-user tier prices public with the main features per tier, but at least one commonly needed piece (SSO, SIEM integration, self-hosting, minimum seats) is unpriced or "on request".
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
The captured pricing page shows the tier names, a 14-day business trial without a credit card, and how breach-scanner domains differ per tier, but we found no public information on per-user prices, seat minimums, add-ons or where provisioning and the audit features sit. A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages. 1 2
The Identity Engineer
The captured pricing pages show the tier structure, a 14-day trial without a credit card, and some per-tier feature splits such as breach scanner domain counts, but we found no public price per user at all, and the enterprise tier is a demo request. I cannot compute an annual invoice for my seat count from what is published. 1 2
The Compliance Auditor
The pricing page compares tiers by features — breach-scanner domains, vault counts, enterprise support levels — and a 14-day business trial requires no credit card. But I found no public price figure at all — no per-user price, seat minimum, minimum term or VAT treatment — and larger seat packages are routed to sales. A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages. 1 2 5
The SME Owner
The pricing page shows tiers and per-tier features — Teams gets one breach-scanner domain, Business up to ten, a 14-day trial with no credit card — but the captured pages give no price figure at all, and larger seat packages are routed through sales. As an owner budgeting forty seats I cannot compute a euro from these pages, and I can't see where SSO sits relative to the price because there are no prices to sit against. 2 1 5
The DevOps Engineer
The captured pricing page does map features to tiers — one data breach scanner domain on Teams, up to ten on Business, a 14-day trial with no credit card — but we found no public information on per-user prices for any tier, on seat minimums, or on add-ons, and the enterprise segment is a demo request and a sales email. I cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages, and for me that is the whole test of pricing transparency. 1 2
The Skeptic
The captured pricing page lays out six plan segments with feature tables and a 14-day business trial without a credit card, but no per-user price, seat minimum or add-on price appears on any page we captured, and the enterprise segment routes to a demo request and a sales email. A buyer cannot compute an annual invoice from these pages. 1 2
European sovereignty — proven facts
0 of 4 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data residency | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Subprocessors | Not determined ⚠ unverified | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about NordPass
Is NordPass European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where NordPass is based.
Where does NordPass store data?
The default storage location for customer data is not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 13 Oct 2026. The vendor’s pages mention the US and the EU as hosting locations, per the vendor’s page captured 1 Oct 2026.
Does NordPass have a free plan?
Yes. NordPass has a free plan, per the vendor’s page captured 1 Oct 2026.
What are the best alternatives to NordPass?
As of 21 Oct 2026, the panel rates Password Depot (3.5/5), Keeper (3/5) and Passbolt (3/5) highest among the other 18 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Password Depot (EU-Made). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: NordPass alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 1 Oct 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Legal entity, Subprocessors. Not confirmed on the vendor’s own pages as captured.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- 6 compliance facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 6 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 4 pricing facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 3 legal facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 support facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 2 sovereignty dimensions could not be confirmed on the vendor’s own pages and are shown as unknown. Know more? Tell us
- 6 of the readings below were written against an earlier fact sheet — a fact has been corrected, added or pulled since. Until the panel next runs on this product you are reading the older judgement. Know more? Tell us
Sources (6)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor homepage nordpass.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 2 Pricing page nordpass.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy business.nordsec.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 4 Terms of service business.nordsec.com Checked 13 Oct 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap nordpass.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap nordpass.com Checked 1 Oct 2026 Details →