Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars
Category median
Sovereignty: 2 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by KL Bits GmbH · padloc.app
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Padloc at a glance
- Vendor
- KL Bits GmbH
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Padloc 2/5, the mean of 6 judges. Padloc is an open-source password manager licensed under the AGPL, whose captured pages name a German entity, MaKleSoft UG in Ansbach and Munich, though the vendor listing names KL Bits GmbH. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 18 Nov 2026. all sources
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Padloc is an open-source password manager licensed under the AGPL, whose captured pages name a German entity, MaKleSoft UG in Ansbach and Munich, though the vendor listing names KL Bits GmbH. Security architecture is strongest, scoring 6: the documentation names AES-GCM at 256 bits, PBKDF2 with SHA-256, RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS; the vendor states it never stores the master password; and the only published audit is a Cure53 test from April 2016. Deployment and portability spans 4 to 6 — the compliance auditor sat at 4, citing no public information on offline access during an outage or an EU cloud region, while others credit self-hosting and client coverage. Weakest are audit and policy at 2, where only a developer logging module appears, and pricing transparency at 0 to 2, with no public prices. Sharing and access control at 4 to 5 and identity integration at 3 to 4 show roles and directory-sync code, but no public information on admin recovery or named single sign-on; sovereignty at 4 to 5 rests on German law yet leaves vault data residency unstated.
Speaks for it
- Cryptography documented algorithm by algorithm — AES-GCM at 256 bits, PBKDF2 with SHA-256, RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS — with master passwords stated as never stored.
- Clients open source under the AGPL, with a downloadable Cure53 penetration test report.
- Self-hosting documented with up-to-date Docker guides, letting a buyer run the server and remove the vendor from the data path.
- Clients for web, desktop, iOS, Android and a browser extension, with encrypted export of all vaults bundled as a zip and CSV import.
- German contracting entity — MaKleSoft UG with Ansbach and Munich addresses — under German governing law and Munich courts, with stated GDPR obligations.
Held against it
- The only published audit is a Cure53 penetration test from April 2016, with no public information on recurring audits, a bug bounty or incident history.
- Audit and policy scores sit at 2: only a developer logging module appears, with no public information on admin event logs, enforceable master-password or MFA policies, password health or breach reports, or SIEM integration.
- No public prices on the captured pages — no per-user figures, tiers, seat minimums or billing terms — and the commercial licence is acquired by contacting sales.
- No public information on single sign-on with named identity providers, SCIM, hardware security keys or passkeys; directory sync appears only as code documentation.
- No public information on vault data residency, a data processing agreement, or subprocessors beyond Stripe, and the privacy policy describes hosting providers as conforming to the U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield framework.
Best for
- You want to self-host the server and apps and inspect the code under the AGPL licence.
- You value cryptography you can verify yourself, with every algorithm named in public documentation.
- You need portable data — encrypted export of all vaults bundled as a zip, plus CSV import from other applications.
- You prefer a German-law vendor and can self-host to keep vault data on infrastructure you control.
Avoid if
- You must satisfy auditors and need admin event logs, password health or breach reports, and a path to SIEM.
- You need single sign-on with a named identity provider, SCIM provisioning, or hardware security keys and passkeys.
- You need to compute costs from published prices before engaging sales.
- You depend on a documented admin recovery or offboarding path when a member forgets their master password.
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 3 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 2 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 2 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 1 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 2 of 5 |
| Pricing transparency | 0.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The security documentation names every algorithm and key derivation function (AES-GCM 256, PBKDF2-SHA256, RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS), describes end-to-end encryption performed offline on the device with the vendor stating it is never in a position to decrypt user data, and a Cure53 penetration test from April 2016 is downloadable. That test is a decade old at capture, and we found no public information on recurring audits, a bug bounty, an incident history, or a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted. AGPL-licensed clients partially compensate by making the cryptography reviewable. 4 5 6
The Identity Engineer
The security documentation names the full primitive set I would audit for — AES-GCM at 256 bits, PBKDF2-SHA-256 for key derivation, RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS for wrapping and signing — with encryption performed on the device and master passwords stated as never stored. One Cure53 penetration test is published as a downloadable report, but it is from April 2016, and we found no public information on recurring audits, a bug bounty, or which fields such as URLs and metadata remain unencrypted. AGPL-licensed source that I can review myself lifts it above a paper claim. 6 5 4 3
The Compliance Auditor
The security documentation names every algorithm and the key derivation (AES-GCM 256, PBKDF2 with 128-bit salt, RSA-OAEP/PSS, HMAC-SHA-256), describes the end-to-end zero-knowledge design in which the vendor states it is never in a position to decrypt, and a Cure53 penetration test report from April 2016 is downloadable. That reaches a published whitepaper with one independent audit, but I found no public information on recurring audits since, a bug bounty or disclosure policy, a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted, or documented incident history, so I sit above the whitepaper-with-audit level rather than at the full-audit-programme level. 6 5 3 4
The SME Owner
The security documentation names every algorithm — AES-GCM 256, PBKDF2 with SHA-256, RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS — and describes end-to-end encryption performed offline on the device with the master password never stored, backed by a downloadable Cure53 penetration test report and AGPL-licensed source I could inspect. That test dates from April 2016, though, and I found no public information on recurring audits, a bug bounty, or incident history, so I stopped just above the middle. 3 4 5 6
The DevOps Engineer
The security documentation names every algorithm — AES-GCM at 256 bits, PBKDF2 with SHA-256 and a 128-bit salt, RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS — describes end-to-end encryption performed offline on the device with keys derived from the master password, and backs it with an independent Cure53 penetration test from April 2016 whose full report is downloadable and AGPL-licensed source I can review myself. That single audit is ten years old by the capture date, and we found no public information on which fields stay unencrypted, a bug bounty, recurring audits or incident history, so I stop just above the whitepaper-plus-audit level. 6 5 4 3
The Skeptic
The security documentation names its design end to end — AES-GCM-256, PBKDF2-SHA-256, RSA-OAEP/PSS, a Secure Remote Password variation, master password never stored — and the clients are open source under the AGPL with a downloadable penetration test report. But that audit is a single Cure53 test from April 2016, a decade stale at capture, and I found no statement of which fields are and are not encrypted, no bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, and no incident history. Published cryptography resting on one old report. 3 4 5 6
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.
3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.
8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Shared vaults inside organizations are documented with Owner, Admin and Member roles, group-based vault assignment, and a published sharing key model where a shared key is wrapped per accessor with RSA public keys. We found no public information on permission levels within a vault, admin account recovery, or what happens to a leaver's shared items. The vendor states it never stores the master password, which is the right privacy posture but leaves recovery and offboarding entirely undescribed. 3 6 7
The Identity Engineer
Shared vaults inside organizations, Owner/Admin/Member roles, group-based vault assignment, and a genuinely documented sharing key model: a shared key wrapped with each accessor's RSA public key and regenerated whenever accessors change. We found no public information on permission granularity below role level, time-limited or one-time sharing, emergency access, or what happens to a leaver's shared items; the vendor states it never stores master passwords, and no admin recovery path is described. 6 7 3
The Compliance Auditor
Shared vaults, groups, and Owner, Admin and Member roles are documented, and the sharing key model is explicit: a shared key encrypted with each accessor's RSA public key, with the private key encrypted under the master password. I found no public information on permission levels such as read or manage, on admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items, or on time-limited or emergency access, and the privacy policy confirms the master password is never stored, which shapes what recovery can exist. 6 7 3
The SME Owner
Shared vaults inside organizations with Owner, Admin and Member roles, groups, and a spelled-out key model (a shared key wrapped for each member's public key) are all documented. The two things my company needs most — admin recovery when someone forgets the master password, and documented offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company — have no public information, and the vendor states it never stores the master password, so I sat this between the anchors rather than at the higher one. 3 6 7 8
The DevOps Engineer
Organizations have Owner, Admin and Member roles, each user a private vault, shared vaults assignable directly or via groups, and a genuinely documented key model where the vault's shared key is wrapped with each accessor's RSA public key and rotated when accessors change. We found no public information on per-vault permission levels, admin recovery of a locked-out member, emergency access, or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company, which keeps this below the full business-sharing level. 6 7 13
The Skeptic
Shared vaults with a documented key-wrapping scheme, groups, and Owner/Admin/Member roles are described, and the cryptography behind sharing is published down to the container that deletes keys on lock. What I do not see is the governance that matters when a person leaves: no vault-level permission granularity, and no admin recovery or offboarding story — and since the vendor rightly never stores the master password, that silence on recovery is a real operational risk for a team. Scored between basic sharing and a governed model. 3 6 7
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.
3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
Published code documentation shows a directory synchronization module handling user and group creation, update and deletion events, and the manual covers managing multi-factor authentication methods and sessions. We found no public information on single sign-on with any named identity provider, on SCIM, on hardware security keys, or on passkeys. The provisioning machinery visibly exists in the codebase, but the identity-provider story a buyer needs is undocumented. 8 9 13
The Identity Engineer
There is a real directory synchronization module in the codebase that implements the directory subscriber interface and handles user created, updated and deleted events plus group events — the joiner-mover-leaver plumbing I run all day — but this is API documentation rather than a product claim. We found no public information on SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, no SCIM statement, no FIDO2 or hardware security keys, and no passkeys; multi-factor methods appear only as a manageable setting, unnamed. 8 9 13
The Compliance Auditor
The developer documentation evidences a directory synchronization component handling user and group created, updated and deleted events, and the manual shows multi-factor authentication methods can be managed in security settings. I found no public information on single sign-on with named identity providers, on SCIM, or on FIDO2 or hardware keys, so the vault's place in a corporate identity stack is only partially evidenced. 8 9 13
The SME Owner
There is a directory synchronization module in the codebase handling user and group creation, update and deletion events, and the security settings let users manage MFA methods and sessions. But I found no public information on single sign-on with any named identity provider, SCIM, or hardware security keys, which for a forty-person firm living in Entra ID or Google is the deciding gap. 8 9 13
The DevOps Engineer
Directory synchronization genuinely exists in the code, with a module handling user and group created, updated and deleted events — the joiner and leaver plumbing I care about — and MFA methods are managed in the security settings. We found no public information on single sign-on with any named identity provider, SCIM, hardware security keys or passkeys, so the identity stack stops at directory sync and MFA. 8 9 13
The Skeptic
A directory synchronization module exists in the code and handles user and group creation, update and deletion events, and the security settings mention managing MFA methods. But we found no single sign-on provider named anywhere, no description of an SSO unlock or its key model, and no mention of hardware keys or passkeys; directory sync appears only as API classes, not as a product feature with named identity providers. 8 9 13
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.
3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
What bears on auditability is a logging module in the codebase with a generic event class, plus user-level settings such as session management and auto-lock. We found no public information on an admin console with an activity list, password health or breach reports, exportable logs, SIEM integration, or enforceable organization policies. On this record I could not walk an ISO 27001 auditor through who accessed what. 10 11 13
The Identity Engineer
The only evidence is a logging module in the core library — a LogEvent class carrying a type and some data — which is developer plumbing, not an administrator's audit trail. We found no public information on an admin console with event logs, enforceable master-password or MFA policies, password health or breach reports, log export, retention, or SIEM integration. 10 11 3
The Compliance Auditor
What the captured pages show is a logging module inside the core library with a generic event class, which is developer plumbing, not an administrator's audit trail. I found no public information on event logs covering item access, views or copies, on export to a SIEM, on enforceable policies for master password or MFA, on log retention for audit purposes, or on reports aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2, and for my purposes that is the decisive gap. 10 11 13
The SME Owner
The only evidence bearing here is a logging module and a LogEvent class in the core library — developer plumbing, not an administrator's console. I found no public information on event logs of item access, password health or breach reports, enforceable policies, SIEM integration, or retention, so I placed it low. 10 11
The DevOps Engineer
All the captures show on this front is a developer logging module in the core library with a generic event class — nothing an administrator or external auditor could work with. We found no public information on an admin console, event logs of access and changes, password health or breach reports, enforceable policies, SIEM integration or log retention. 10 11
The Skeptic
The only trace of auditability is a logging module in the codebase with a generic event class carrying a type and some data. Nothing captured shows an administrator an event log, an enforceable master-password or MFA policy, password health or breach reporting, or any path to a SIEM — for a tool sold to teams, an auditor currently has nothing to read. 10 11
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.
3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Self-hosting is genuinely documented with up-to-date Docker guides and instructions for building your own apps, the code is AGPL, and clients exist for web, desktop, iOS, Android and a browser extension. Export covers an encrypted password-protected container plus CSV across all vaults bundled as a zip, with CSV import from other applications. We found no public information on an EU cloud region, a status page with incident history, or continued vault access during a vendor outage. 4 12 13
The Identity Engineer
Self-hosting is documented in earnest, with up-to-date Docker guides and instructions for building your own apps, so under the AGPL licence I can run the server and take the vendor out of the path. Clients cover web, desktop, iOS, Android and a browser extension, and export handles all vaults at once as an encrypted container bundled in a zip, with CSV as an alternative and a CSV import assistant. We found no public information on an EU cloud region, a status page, offline access during a vendor outage, or whether the export carries attachments. 12 4 13
The Compliance Auditor
Self-hosting is documented with current Docker guides and guides for building the apps, clients cover web, desktop, iOS, Android and a browser extension, and export offers a password-protected encrypted container for all vaults bundled as a zip, with a CSV import assistant. I found no public information on offline access to the vault during an outage, on an EU cloud region, or on a status page, so I sit between the basic-apps-and-export level and the full deployment-choice level. 12 4 13
The SME Owner
Self-hosting is documented in detail with current Docker guides and instructions for building your own apps, clients span desktop, iOS, Android, browser extension and web, and export covers a password-protected encrypted container for all vaults bundled as a zip plus CSV import from pretty much anywhere. What the pages do not show: a status page with incident history, an EU cloud region, or documented vault access during a vendor outage, which kept me from going higher. 4 12 13
The DevOps Engineer
This is where the product earns my trust: self-hosting the server and apps is documented with up-to-date Docker guides, the AGPL licence and open repository let me read and run my own infrastructure, clients cover web, desktop, iOS, Android and a browser extension, and export offers an encrypted, password-protected container bundling all vaults as a zip alongside CSV import. For my own data centre I still miss documented high availability and backup for the self-hosted deployment, and we found no public information on an EU cloud option, a status page, or vault access continuing during a vendor outage. 12 4 13
The Skeptic
Self-hosting is genuinely documented — up-to-date Docker guides, build-your-own-apps guides, and the vendor's own line that with self-hosting you don't even have to trust them — and clients cover web, desktop, iOS, Android and a browser extension, with an encrypted container export that can bundle all vaults and a CSV import assistant. It stops short of the higher level: no EU cloud region is stated, no Linux client is named, no status page or incident history appears, and nothing documents vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service. 4 12 13
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The contracting side is demonstrably German: MaKleSoft UG in Ansbach, a Munich postal address, German governing law and courts, GDPR obligations, and payment records kept under German tax law; a self-hosting option can remove the vendor from the data path. However, the privacy policy describes hosting by third-party processors that conform to the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield framework, and we found no public information on where vault data is hosted, on a DPA, or on a subprocessor list with locations. 2 3 5 12
The Identity Engineer
The captured pages give different entity names — KL Bits GmbH in the vendor listing, MaKleSoft UG in the site copyright with a German address — under German governing law with Munich courts and stated GDPR obligations, and the software is self-hostable so the vendor can be removed from the data path. Vault data residency is unproven: the privacy policy says only that unnamed third-party processors provide hosting and that they conform to the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield framework. We found no published DPA or subprocessor list with locations. 3 2 12 4
The Compliance Auditor
The chain is proven European at the top: the contracting entity is a German company with addresses in Ansbach and Munich, the terms name German law and the Munich courts, the vendor states it is bound by the GDPR, the software is AGPL-licensed, and self-hosting removes the vendor from the data path. I found no public information on where vault data and metadata are hosted, on a data processing agreement, or on a subprocessor list beyond Stripe; the privacy policy names unnamed third-party processors that conform to the U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield Framework, which leaves the hosting chain unresolved. 2 3 12 4
The SME Owner
The contracting entity is German — MaKleSoft UG with addresses in Ansbach and Munich — under German law and Munich courts, GDPR-bound, with a self-hosted option and copyleft-licensed source. But the privacy policy states data is held by third-party processors conforming to the U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield framework, and I found no public information on where vault data resides, a data processing agreement, or the subprocessor list beyond Stripe for payments. 2 3 4 5 12
The DevOps Engineer
The captured material gives different names for the vendor entity, but the privacy page and terms show a German company (MaKleSoft UG, addresses in Ansbach and Munich), German governing law with Munich courts, GDPR commitments, and Stripe named for payment processing. Hosting location, a data processing agreement and further subprocessors are unknown to me, though the self-hosting option with copyleft source lets me remove the vendor from the data path entirely — which is the part I would use. 3 2 5 12
The Skeptic
The pages carry real German weight — a German entity with Munich and Ansbach addresses, German governing law and Munich courts, GDPR commitments, ten-year German tax-law retention for payment records — plus a self-hosting option and AGPL-licensed source. But the chain is unstated where it counts: data residency is not given, no data processing agreement was found, the only named subprocessor is Stripe for payments, and the privacy policy describes hosting providers as conforming to the U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield framework, which tells me nothing reassuring about where vault metadata actually sits. 2 3 4 12
Pricing transparency
n/r
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.
5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO not rated — no public information
We found no public information on pricing: no tier prices, seat minimums, add-ons or terms appear on the captured homepage, terms of service, privacy policy or self-hosting guide. A buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages, and this criterion is reported but does not count toward my verdict. 1 2 3 12
The Identity Engineer
Paid subscriptions exist — the terms reference amounts paid and refund of the unused period, and payments run through Stripe — and a commercial licence is acquired by emailing sales. We found no public prices on the captured pages: no per-user figures, no tier breakdown, no seat minimums, and no term or VAT details, so I could not compute an annual cost for two thousand staff. 4 2 3
The Compliance Auditor
The captured pages show that paid subscriptions exist, since payments run through Stripe and liability is capped at amounts paid under the terms, but they give no per-user price, tier structure, seat minimums or term conditions. The commercial licence is explicitly a sales conversation at a contact address, and I found no public prices on any page I read, so a buyer cannot compute an annual cost from these pages. 4 3 2
The SME Owner
The terms confirm a paid subscription model — refunds for paid and unused periods, payment processed by Stripe, VAT records kept under German tax law — but I found no public information on per-user prices, tiers, seat minimums, or which features sit in which tier. I cannot compute what this would cost my forty people from the captured pages, so it sits near the bottom. 2 3
The DevOps Engineer
We found no public prices on any captured page — no per-user figures, tiers, seat minimums or billing terms — and the commercial licence for the open-source code is acquired by contacting sales. Nothing here lets me budget a deployment from published pages alone. 4 2
The Skeptic
No captured page shows a price, tier, seat minimum or term — the homepage, terms of service and help manual are silent on figures even though the terms presuppose paid subscriptions and cancellation. The code repository routes commercial licensing through a sales contact, so from what is published a buyer cannot compute any annual cost at all. 2 4 13
European sovereignty — proven facts
2 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options | Self-hostable | 1/1 pts | 12 Report an error |
| Open source |
Open source (copyleft)
unverified
Why unverified?The repository also offers a commercial license as an alternative, but the AGPL is stated explicitly as the software's licence. |
1/1 pts | 4 Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Padloc
Is Padloc European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Padloc is based.
Where does Padloc store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
Does Padloc have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Padloc?
As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Padloc alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 17 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Open source. The repository also offers a commercial license as an alternative, but the AGPL is stated explicitly as the software's licence.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We could not confirm any pricing information on the vendor’s own pages as captured, so this page shows none rather than a statement we cannot stand behind. Know more? Tell us
- 12 product facts could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and were left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 compliance fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 integrations fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 legal fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
- 1 support fact could not be confirmed on the vendor’s page as captured and was left out of this page and of the panel’s material. Know more? Tell us
Sources (13)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Terms of service — found from the homepage padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Privacy policy — found from the homepage padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Code repository (open-source licence) — found from the homepage github.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 12 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap docs.padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 13 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap padloc.app Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →