Encryption model & independent audits
How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The Compliance Auditor
The security documentation names every algorithm and the key derivation (AES-GCM 256, PBKDF2 with 128-bit salt, RSA-OAEP/PSS, HMAC-SHA-256), describes the end-to-end zero-knowledge design in which the vendor states it is never in a position to decrypt, and a Cure53 penetration test report from April 2016 is downloadable. That reaches a published whitepaper with one independent audit, but I found no public information on recurring audits since, a bug bounty or disclosure policy, a field-by-field statement of what is and is not encrypted, or documented incident history, so I sit above the whitepaper-with-audit level rather than at the full-audit-programme level. 6 5 3 4