Pleasant Password Server
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Category median
Sovereignty: 1 of 6 dimensions proven
0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.
by Pleasant Solutions · www.pleasantpasswords.com
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Pleasant Password Server at a glance
- Vendor
- Pleasant Solutions
- Headquarters
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Data hosting
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Free plan
- Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
- Panel verdict
- The AI panel rates Pleasant Password Server 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Pleasant Password Server, from Pleasant Solutions, is a self-hosted password manager that installs on your own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host. how scores are made
- As of
- Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 18 Nov 2026. all sources
Pleasant Password Server alternatives, European ones first →
Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.
The panel's verdict
Pleasant Password Server, from Pleasant Solutions, is a self-hosted password manager that installs on your own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host. Its strongest scores come in audit and policy and in sharing and access control: every password fetch is logged with who, when, IP and status, exportable to CSV or JSON, folder permissions inherit hierarchically with blocking, and a provisioning role grants access without viewing passwords. Judges scored both 6 to 7, the audit spread reflecting the weight given to the absent log-retention period and breach-monitoring reports. Identity integration scored a uniform 6 on SAML SSO with named providers, enforced sign-in with an emergency local URL, and AD/LDAP sync. Security architecture scored a uniform 4: the zero-knowledge layer is specific — AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit, PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 at 100,000 iterations — but reaches only Passwords and TOTP Secrets in the web client, and the judges found no public information on independent audits or certifications. Sovereignty scored a uniform 3: self-hosting is proven; jurisdiction, subprocessors and a data-processing agreement are unstated. No price appears on any page.
Speaks for it
- Individually toggleable audit events covering every password fetch, session, access and admin change, exportable to CSV or JSON with syslog support
- Hierarchical folder permissions with blockable inheritance, six default roles plus limited-admin patterns, and a provisioning role that grants access without viewing passwords
- SAML SSO documented against eighteen named providers including Microsoft Entra ID, Okta and Google, enforceable as the only sign-in path with a local emergency URL
- Self-hosting on your own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host such as Azure, AWS or RackSpace, with local hosting recommended for full control of your data
- Roughly 45 import formats including KeePass KDBX, XML and CSV, with a CSV import wizard for custom formats
Held against it
- The zero-knowledge layer encrypts only Passwords and TOTP Secrets, only in the web client, from version 8.0 of the Enterprise+SSO edition, and the setting cannot be disabled once enabled
- We found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, certifications or a bug bounty behind the cryptography
- Beyond self-hosting, the contracting entity's jurisdiction, data residency, subprocessors and a data-processing agreement are unstated on the captured pages
- We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, or SCIM provisioning and passkeys
- No price, per-user rate or seat minimum appears on any captured page, though a valid license is required whether the server is local or cloud-hosted
Best for
- You run Windows Server and want the vault entirely on your own infrastructure, local or on a cloud host such as Azure, AWS or RackSpace
- You need delegated administration: provisioning, help-desk and report-and-audit roles that grant or monitor access without exposing passwords
- Your auditors must trace exactly who fetched which password, when and from which IP, with export to CSV or JSON
- You standardize on SAML SSO with providers such as Microsoft Entra ID, Okta or AD FS and want enforced sign-in with an emergency local URL
Avoid if
- You require third-party verification — ask the vendor: the public pages we read do not show it
- Your users work mainly in the KeePass or mobile clients rather than the web client; other client apps are blocked from the end-to-end encrypted values
- Your procurement requires a published data-processing agreement, subprocessor list or stated vendor jurisdiction before signature
The scores
| Criterion | Panel median |
|---|---|
| Encryption model & independent audits | 2 of 5 |
| Sharing, roles & recovery | 3 of 5 |
| SSO, directory sync & provisioning | 3 of 5 |
| Audit logs, policies & reporting | 3.5 of 5 |
| Hosting choice, offline access & export | 3 of 5 |
| European sovereignty | 1.5 of 5 |
Encryption model & independent audits
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How this is scored
What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.
0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.
3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.
5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.
8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.
10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.
The CISO
The zero-knowledge page names the ciphers (AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit), the key derivation (PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256, 100,000 iterations), states the fields the layer encrypts — passwords and TOTP secrets — and asserts the server cannot decrypt, while scoping the feature to the web client from version 8.0 of the Enterprise+SSO edition with KeePass and mobile clients blocked from those values. What I need before a breach, not after, is absent: we found no public information on any independent audit, penetration test, certification, bug bounty or incident history. 1 2 3
The Identity Engineer
The zero-knowledge documentation is unusually specific — AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit, PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 at 100,000 iterations, a stated set of fields encrypted on the device (passwords and TOTP secrets), and an explicit statement that the server cannot decrypt — but we found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests or named certifications backing the design. The end-to-end layer also reaches only the web client, with KeePass and mobile clients blocked from those values. Good design documentation, unproven by third parties. 2 3 1
The Compliance Auditor
The zero-knowledge page names AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit and PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 with 100,000 iterations, states the server cannot decrypt user passwords, and names the fields encrypted client-side (passwords and TOTP secrets), with TLS hardening guidance alongside. I found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, a certification with a published report, a bug bounty, or disclosed incidents; the homepage's compliance-standard names are not audit evidence. The pages also state the zero-knowledge layer currently reaches only the web client, with other client apps blocked from those encrypted values. 2 3 1
The SME Owner
The zero-knowledge page names real cryptography — AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit, PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 at 100,000 iterations — and states the server itself cannot decrypt, while being explicit that only passwords and TOTP secrets are covered, and only in the web client of the Enterprise+SSO edition. We found no public information on independent audits, penetration tests, certifications, a bug bounty, or incident history, and that is what keeps me from going higher. 1 2 3
The DevOps Engineer
The zero-knowledge page is specific — AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit, PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 at 100,000 iterations, with the stated design that the server cannot decrypt passwords or TOTP secrets — though the mode is optional, web-client only, and irreversible once enabled. Best-practice guidance covers TLS versions and cipher hardening. I found no independent audit, penetration test, bug bounty, incident history or reviewable cryptography on any captured page, and no statement of which fields such as URLs and metadata remain unencrypted. 2 3
The Skeptic
The zero-knowledge page names real cryptography — AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit, PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 at 100,000 iterations — and states the server cannot decrypt, but only in the web client, only for Passwords and TOTP Secrets, and only from version 8.0 of the Enterprise+SSO edition, with the Paranoid module covering passwords outside that mode. I found no public information on an independent audit, penetration test, bug bounty or incident disclosure; the homepage list of supported compliance standards (FIPS, GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS) names no certifying body or report, so the client-side encryption is well specified but nothing verifies it. 1 2 3
Sharing, roles & recovery
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How this is scored
How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.
0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.
3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.
5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.
8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.
10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.
The CISO
Hierarchical folder permissions with blocked inheritance, six default roles plus modifiable limited-admin roles, a provisioning role that can grant and revoke access without viewing passwords, and documented corporate-key recovery for administrative password resets give a credible governance model. We found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or emergency access with a waiting period. 1 2 4 5
The Identity Engineer
Hierarchical folder permissions with blockable inheritance, six default roles, limited-admin and help-desk patterns, and a provisioning role that can grant and revoke access without ever viewing the password — that is genuine delegated governance at my scale. Corporate keys delegated for admin password resets are documented alongside it. We found no public information on offboarding a leaver's shared items, time-limited or one-time external sharing, or emergency access with a waiting period. 4 5 2 1
The Compliance Auditor
Hierarchical folder permissions with inheritable and blockable access, default and limited admin roles, and a provisioning role that grants and blocks access without ever viewing the password are all documented. Recovery carries its key model: corporate keys delegated for admin resets, and a user secret key that cannot be recovered if lost. I found no public information on offboarding a leaver's shared items, time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or emergency access with a waiting period. 4 5 2 1
The SME Owner
Hierarchical folders with inheritance you can block, ready-made roles including a provisioning role that grants access to credentials without ever seeing the password, and admin recovery through a delegated corporate key for password resets plus help-desk lockout resets — that is the shared-vault model my team would actually use. We found no public information on what happens to a leaver's own items on offboarding, time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or emergency access with a waiting period. 2 4 5 9
The DevOps Engineer
Access is folder-based and hierarchical with inheritance that can be blocked at any sub-folder or entry, plus six default roles and configurable limited-admin, help-desk and provisioning roles — the provisioning role grants and blocks access without ever seeing the passwords, and Corporate Keys give admins a password-reset path. I found no public information on time-limited or one-time sharing with external parties, or emergency access with a waiting period. 1 2 4 5
The Skeptic
Hierarchical folder permissions with inheritance and blocking, six default roles plus documented limited-admin and help-desk patterns, a provisioning role that grants access without ever viewing passwords, and an add-on that lets employees use enterprise passwords without seeing or copying them are all documented in usable detail. Recovery is documented with its key mechanics — a Corporate Key delegated to admins for resetting user passwords, and a secret key that cannot be recovered if lost — though I found no public information on emergency access, time-limited or one-time external sharing, or an explicit offboarding procedure. 1 2 4 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning
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How this is scored
How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.
0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.
3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.
5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.
8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.
10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.
The CISO
SAML 2.0 single sign-on is documented with a long list of named providers including Microsoft Entra ID, Okta and Google, enforceable sign-in with an admin-only emergency direct sign-in, single log-out and passwordless via SAML, alongside Active Directory / LDAP import and synchronization of user and role changes with optional admin approval, and two-factor via authenticator or YubiKey. We found no public information on SCIM, automated suspension on deprovisioning, or passkey support. 2 6 7 9
The Identity Engineer
SAML SSO is documented step by step for Microsoft Entra ID among eighteen named providers, with enforced sign-in, an emergency direct sign-in exception, single log-out, and the zero-knowledge page stating the server cannot derive user keys even under passwordless SAML. The leaver flow is what I run on: user and role changes from AD/LDAP are synchronized and processed automatically or on admin approval, but we found no public information on SCIM or on immediate suspension of a leaver's vault, and YubiKey is the only hardware second factor named — no passkeys or FIDO2 for the vault itself. 7 6 2 9
The Compliance Auditor
SAML 2.0 single sign-on is documented against a long list of named providers — Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, Google, AD FS among them — with Active Directory/LDAP directory import, enforceable SSO-only sign-in with an admin emergency bypass, single log-out, and YubiKey or authenticator two-factor that can be set to required. Passwordless sign-in via SAML under the zero-knowledge model is also documented. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, automated suspension on deprovisioning, or passkey support. 7 6 9 2
The SME Owner
SAML single sign-on is documented with a long list of named providers including Entra ID, Okta and Google, it can be enforced as the only way in while admins keep a local emergency sign-in, and Active Directory/LDAP user import and synchronisation with optional admin approval is described; two-factor covers authenticator apps and YubiKey hardware keys and can be set to required. We found no public information on how the vault key is released under single sign-on, automated suspension when someone is deprovisioned, or passkeys. 2 6 7 9
The DevOps Engineer
SAML SSO is documented against a long provider list including Microsoft Entra ID, Okta and Google, with AD/LDAP directory import, admin-approved directory sync, enforced SSO-only sign-in with a local emergency URL, Single Log Out, and two-factor via authenticator or YubiKey. We found no public information on SCIM provisioning, passkeys, group-driven vault permissions, or how the vault key is released on an SSO unlock. 2 6 7 9
The Skeptic
SAML single sign-on is documented with a long list of named providers including Microsoft Entra ID, Okta and Google, an enforced SSO-only mode with an emergency local sign-in exception, single log-out, and AD/LDAP directory import whose synchronized user and role changes can be auto-applied or admin-approved; MFA covers authenticator apps and YubiKey with an admin-controllable two-week browser bypass cookie. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, how the vault key is derived or released when signing in through a provider, or passkey support. 2 6 7 9
Audit logs, policies & reporting
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How this is scored
What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.
0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.
3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.
5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.
8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.
10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.
The CISO
The event catalogue is unusually granular — password fetched, offline sync, access levels added and removed, role and admin-settings changes — individually toggleable, exportable to CSV and JSON, with syslog configuration and a dedicated report-and-audit role, plus enforceable password, MFA-required, lockout and timeout policies. We found no public information on log retention, password-health or breach-monitoring reports, or compliance reporting an ISO 27001 audit could use. 5 8 9
The Identity Engineer
The event log is deep — every password fetch, offline cache sync, permission, role, session and admin change, individually toggleable and exportable to CSV or JSON, with syslog configuration available and a dedicated Report & Audit role that can read audits without broader admin powers. Enforceable policies cover password rules, mandatory two-factor and lockout. We found no public information on password health or breach-monitoring reports, log retention, or enforceable sharing and export policies. 8 9 5
The Compliance Auditor
This is the log catalog I ask for: a password-fetched event recording who, when, IP and status whenever an entry's password is sent to a client, plus access additions and deletions, blocked inheritance, session log-on and log-off, admin setting changes and offline sync — each event individually enableable and exportable to CSV or JSON, with syslog configuration available for the SIEM. Enforceable policies cover password rules, required two-factor, lockouts, timeouts and inactivity locking, and a Report & Audit role can read reports and audit events. I found no public information on log retention, tamper-evidence, password-health or breach reports, or report material aligned to ISO 27001 or NIS2. 8 9 5
The SME Owner
The audit log is genuinely granular — every password fetched, every entry change with old and new values, sessions, access-level changes — with events individually enabled or disabled and CSV and JSON export, and there is a dedicated Report & Audit role for people who only need visibility. Password and two-factor policies are enforceable. We found no public information on password health or breach-monitoring reports, log retention periods, or compliance-ready reporting. 5 8 9
The DevOps Engineer
The audit catalogue is deep — session logons, every password fetched, access added or blocked, entry and folder changes with old and new values, admin settings changes — each event individually toggleable and exportable to CSV or JSON, with syslog settings present. Enforceable policies cover password rules, lockout, two-factor required, timeouts and pushed client configs, and a Report & Audit role can run the reports. We found no stated log retention period, no named SIEM destinations and no compliance-aligned reports. 5 8 9
The Skeptic
The event catalog is unusually granular — password fetched, offline sync, access added/deleted/expired, inheritance blocked, session and admin-setting changes — with individually toggleable events, export to CSV and JSON carrying who/what/when/status/IP, syslog support, and enforceable policies for password rules, MFA, lockouts with alerts, timeouts and inactivity locks pushed through client configuration. I found no public information on log retention periods, password health or breach-monitoring reports, or SIEM targets beyond syslog. 8 9
Hosting choice, offline access & export
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How this is scored
Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.
0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.
3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.
5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.
8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.
10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.
The CISO
Self-hosting is the documented model: install on the customer's own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host, with the vendor stating there is no functional difference and recommending local hosting for full control of the data; offline caching of entries, a web client, a KeePass desktop client, mobile apps and a browser plugin are referenced, with roughly 45 import formats documented. We found no public information on an EU cloud region, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, or a documented encrypted full-fidelity export. 1 8 10 11
The Identity Engineer
The product installs on the customer's own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host of their choosing with no feature difference, which hands hosting and region control to the buyer entirely. Offline caching is evidenced by the audit event for entries sent to the client, and roughly forty-five import formats cover KeePass and Chrome. We found no public information on a documented full-fidelity export of vault data, a status page with incident history, or Linux and macOS clients. 11 1 10 8
The Compliance Auditor
Self-hosting is the documented model: install on the customer's own Windows Server, locally or on any cloud host such as Azure, AWS or RackSpace, with a valid license and no functional difference, and offline caching of entries to clients is itself a logged event. Import covers roughly 45 formats including KeePass KDBX, XML and CSV plus Chrome, with a generic CSV importer and an import wizard. I found no public information on the completeness or encryption of export, Linux or macOS clients, a status page, or continuity during a vendor outage. 11 1 10 8
The SME Owner
I can run the whole thing on my own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host, with the same license either way — so the vendor is not in my data path — and entries are cached for offline use, with import from roughly forty-five formats including KeePass and Chrome. We found no public information on a European region offering, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, or an encrypted full-fidelity export covering attachments. 1 8 10 11
The DevOps Engineer
This runs in your own rack: documented installation on your own Windows Server, locally or on any cloud host, with local hosting recommended for full control of the data and the same licence either way. A RESTful API exists for clients, offline caching of entries is an audited event, and roughly 45 import formats including KeePass are documented. I found no public information on high-availability or backup procedures, Linux or macOS clients, or the export path — so whether leaving the product loses anything is undocumented. 1 8 9 10 11
The Skeptic
The product is self-hosted on the customer's own Windows Server, locally or on any cloud host such as Azure, AWS or RackSpace, with no functional difference and a vendor recommendation of local hosting for full control of data; offline caching is evidenced in the audit events and import covers roughly 45 formats including KeePass, Chrome and generic CSV. I found no public information on a documented full-fidelity export path, Linux clients, or a status page with incident history, and the captured pages name only the Windows KeePass desktop client with mobile and browser clients mentioned in passing. 1 8 10 11
European sovereignty
panel opinion
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How this is scored
Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.
0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.
3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.
5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.
8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.
10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.
The CISO
The only European-relevant control the pages prove is self-hosting, which puts the vault on the customer's own infrastructure and removes the vendor from the data path. We found no public information on the vendor's legal jurisdiction, an EU data region, a data processing agreement or any subprocessor; copyright is held by Pleasant Solutions with no jurisdiction stated. 1 11
The Identity Engineer
Self-hosting on the customer's own infrastructure is proven and removes the vendor from the day-to-day data path. Beyond that the chain is unstated: we found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, a data-processing agreement, subprocessors, or the parent company's ownership. One proven element, the rest unknown. 11 1
The Compliance Auditor
The one proven element is self-hosting — the vendor recommends hosting locally on a secure network 'for full control of your data', which removes the vendor from the data path where the customer chooses it. I found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, a parent company, a published data-processing agreement, subprocessors, or any vendor-operated hosting location. 11 1
The SME Owner
A self-hosted option is proven — full control of the password database on our own in-house servers — which shortens the chain considerably. We found no public information on the contracting entity's jurisdiction, data residency, subprocessors, or a data processing agreement. 1 11
The DevOps Engineer
The one proven element is self-hosting: install on your own server, local or cloud-hosted, with local hosting recommended for full control of the data, which puts the vendor outside the data path for vault contents. Everything else in the chain — the contracting entity's jurisdiction, subprocessors, a data-processing agreement, the client update channel — is unstated on the pages we read. 1 11
The Skeptic
The one proven element is self-hosting: the customer installs on their own server, locally or on a cloud host of their choice, which the vendor recommends for full control of the data, and no vendor-run region of any kind is described. The contracting entity's jurisdiction, vendor-side data residency, subprocessors, a DPA and any transfer impact assessment are unknown to me from the captured pages — the GDPR mention sits in a homepage list of supported compliance standards rather than a published agreement. 1 11
Pricing transparency
not rated — the vendor publishes no price
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How this is scored
Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.
0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.
3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.
5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.
8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.
10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.
The CISO
None of the captured pages, including the vendor homepage, publishes a price; we found no public information on per-user prices, seat minimums, add-ons or minimum terms. The pages do document that a license is required for cloud-hosted installs and that single sign-on and zero-knowledge encryption sit in an Enterprise+SSO edition, so a buyer cannot begin to compute an annual cost. 1 2 11
The Identity Engineer
The captured pages confirm a license is required whether the server is local or cloud-hosted, and they name an Enterprise+SSO edition, but we found no public price for any tier — no per-user figure, seat minimum or billing period. From these pages an annual cost for my two thousand users cannot be computed. 11 2
The Compliance Auditor
Edition names are public — zero-knowledge encryption and SAML SSO sit in the Enterprise+SSO Edition, and a valid license is required whether installed locally or in the cloud — but no price figure, per-user rate, seat minimum or term appears on any page we read. A buyer cannot compute even a starting annual cost from the public material. 2 7 11 1
The SME Owner
The only pricing-relevant detail I can find is that single sign-on and the zero-knowledge encryption are both documented only for an "Enterprise+SSO" edition, so the feature I need is gated to that tier. We found no public information on per-user prices, seat minimums, or terms on the captured pages, so I cannot compute what this would cost my forty people. 1 2 7
The DevOps Engineer
The captured pages name an Enterprise+SSO edition that gates zero-knowledge encryption and SSO, and confirm a licence is required for cloud installs just as for local ones. We found no public prices on any page read — no per-user rate, no 'from' price, and no seat minimums. 2 7 11
The Skeptic not rated — no public information
I found no public information on pricing: none of the captured pages, including the homepage, shows a price, a tier list or seat minimums, and the only licensing fact is that a valid license is required whether the server is hosted locally or in the cloud. Edition names such as Enterprise+SSO appear throughout the documentation without any public price attached. 1 2 7 11
European sovereignty — proven facts
1 of 6 dimensions provenBuilt only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.
| Legal entity | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosting location | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Hosting options |
Self-hostable
unverified
Why unverified?The page describes the customer installing the product on their own Windows server (locally or on a cloud host), but never mentions a vendor-run EU region option. |
1/1 pts | 11 Report an error |
| Open source | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Data processing agreement | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
| Transfer impact assessment | Not determined | — | uncited Report an error |
Questions about Pleasant Password Server
Is Pleasant Password Server European?
Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Pleasant Password Server is based.
Where does Pleasant Password Server store data?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
Does Pleasant Password Server have a free plan?
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.
What are the best alternatives to Pleasant Password Server?
As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Pleasant Password Server alternatives.
Where this could be wrong
- Evidence ages. The oldest capture behind this page is from 17 Nov 2026. Vendors change pricing and policies without notice; every fact reflects its source as of the capture date shown in the registry.
- Weak sourcing — Hosting options. The page describes the customer installing the product on their own Windows server (locally or on a cloud host), but never mentions a vendor-run EU region option.
- AI can misread a source. Extraction and judgement are automated; a citation guarantees traceability, not infallibility. If something here is wrong, say so — no account needed, every report is decided within 5 business days, and accepted corrections are published.
What we left out
A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.
- We could not confirm any pricing information on the vendor’s own pages as captured, so this page shows none rather than a statement we cannot stand behind. Know more? Tell us
- We found no public information on compliance on the pages we read (pleasantpasswords.com, pleasantpasswords.com/info/pleasant-password-server/a-install/zero-knowledge-encryption, pleasantpasswords.com/info/pleasant-password-server/f-best-practices/secure-and-harden-your-server-environment/encryption-protocols-and-ciphers, pleasantpasswords.com/info/pleasant-password-server/d-user-access-basics/setup-folder-permissions, pleasantpasswords.com/info/pleasant-password-server/d-user-access-basics/setup-folder-permissions/setup-limited-admin-roles, pleasantpasswords.com/info/pleasant-password-server/j-user-administration/saml-single-sign-on/saml-with-azure-ad and 5 more). If the vendor publishes it somewhere else, send us the page. Know more? Tell us
Sources (11)
The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.
- 1 Vendor page www.pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 2 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 3 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 4 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 5 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 6 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 8 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 9 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 10 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
- 11 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →