Pleasant Password Server

Provenance unknown Report an error

Panel rating · 6 judges · How to read the stars

Category median

Sovereignty: 1 of 6 dimensions proven

0–5 in half steps. 5 means the rubric's top anchor is met on the evidence.

by Pleasant Solutions · www.pleasantpasswords.com

Report an error on this page Is this your product? →

Link to this page

Pleasant Password Server: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai Pleasant Password Server: AI-assisted analysis on whats-best.ai (dark)

Add ?theme=dark to the image address for dark backgrounds. The badge shows the category and the month of the latest evaluation, and EU-Made where that is the product’s provenance. It never shows a score.

Pleasant Password Server at a glance

Vendor
Pleasant Solutions
Headquarters
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Data hosting
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Free plan
Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026
Panel verdict
The AI panel rates Pleasant Password Server 2.5/5, the mean of 6 judges. Pleasant Password Server, from Pleasant Solutions, is a self-hosted password manager that installs on your own Windows server, locally or on any cloud host. how scores are made
As of
Vendor pages captured 17 Nov 2026; evaluated by the panel 18 Nov 2026. all sources

Pleasant Password Server alternatives, European ones first →

Read this page as one judge. Each weighs the same scores by what they care about.

The Skeptic

Weighted verdict

Has read the breach post-mortems. Reads "zero knowledge" next to unencrypted URLs and item names, "independently audited" with no report, "SSO unlock" where the vendor holds half the key, and "admin recovery" that means the vendor can decrypt — and treats a missing incident history as an answer.

Same scores as the panel view — this lens weights them the way this judge cares.

Scored by The Skeptic

Panel median The Skeptic This judge’s scores over the panel median. Each label opens its reasoning below.
Scores per criterion, in stars out of 5
Criterion Panel median The Skeptic
Encryption model & independent audits 2 of 5 2 of 5
Sharing, roles & recovery 3 of 5 3.5 of 5
SSO, directory sync & provisioning 3 of 5 3 of 5
Audit logs, policies & reporting 3.5 of 5 3.5 of 5
Hosting choice, offline access & export 3 of 5 3 of 5
European sovereignty 1.5 of 5 1.5 of 5

Encryption model & independent audits

How this is scored

What the vendor can prove about its security design: end-to-end encryption with named algorithms and key derivation, which fields are encrypted on the device and which are not, independent audits and penetration tests with published results, a bug bounty, and incident history disclosed.

0 — Vault contents are readable by the vendor by its own description: server-side encryption with keys the vendor holds, or no encryption of stored credentials.

3 — Client-side or end-to-end encryption described with the algorithms named; key derivation, audits and the scope of what is encrypted are basic or not described.

5 — A published security whitepaper or security page naming algorithms, key derivation and the client-side encryption model, and an independent audit, penetration test or certification (ISO 27001, SOC 2) named.

8 — A stated list of which fields are and are not encrypted (including URLs and metadata), recurring independent penetration tests or code audits with dates and reports or summaries published, a public bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy, past security incidents documented with their impact, and open-source clients or cryptography that can be reviewed.

10 — The design is verifiable end to end: full source or cryptographic design public, every field encrypted client-side including metadata, audits by named firms repeated yearly with full reports, a threat model that states what a compromise of the vendor's servers would expose, and incident post-mortems published.

Report an error

The Skeptic

The zero-knowledge page names real cryptography — AES256-GCM, RSA 2048-bit, PBKDF2-HMAC SHA256 at 100,000 iterations — and states the server cannot decrypt, but only in the web client, only for Passwords and TOTP Secrets, and only from version 8.0 of the Enterprise+SSO edition, with the Paranoid module covering passwords outside that mode. I found no public information on an independent audit, penetration test, bug bounty or incident disclosure; the homepage list of supported compliance standards (FIPS, GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS) names no certifying body or report, so the client-side encryption is well specified but nothing verifies it. 1 2 3

Report an error

Sharing, roles & recovery

How this is scored

How credentials are shared and governed across a company: shared vaults or collections, role-based permissions, view-only and time-limited access, admin account recovery, emergency access, and what happens to shared items when an employee leaves.

0 — A personal password manager by the vendor's own description: no sharing between users is offered.

3 — Shared folders or vaults between users of one account; permission levels, admin recovery and offboarding are basic or not described.

5 — Shared vaults or collections with permission levels (for example read, edit, manage), groups and admin roles, and an admin account recovery or offboarding that keeps a leaver's shared items with the company.

8 — Recovery and offboarding documented with their key model, granular permissions down to hiding the password while allowing autofill, time-limited and one-time sharing with external parties, emergency access with a waiting period, delegated administration per team or location, and approval workflows for sensitive items.

10 — Access is governed and provable: least-privilege defaults, recovery and emergency access designed so the vendor never holds a key and stated so, periodic access reviews supported in the product, and every grant, change and revocation attributable to a person.

Report an error

The Skeptic

Hierarchical folder permissions with inheritance and blocking, six default roles plus documented limited-admin and help-desk patterns, a provisioning role that grants access without ever viewing passwords, and an add-on that lets employees use enterprise passwords without seeing or copying them are all documented in usable detail. Recovery is documented with its key mechanics — a Corporate Key delegated to admins for resetting user passwords, and a secret key that cannot be recovered if lost — though I found no public information on emergency access, time-limited or one-time external sharing, or an explicit offboarding procedure. 1 2 4 5

Report an error

SSO, directory sync & provisioning

How this is scored

How the vault fits into the company's identity stack: SSO with Entra ID, Okta or Google, and the key model behind an SSO unlock; SCIM or directory sync for joiners and leavers; MFA options including hardware keys; and passkey support for users and the vault itself.

0 — A consumer product by the vendor's own description, with no business administration, SSO or directory connection offered.

3 — Users invited by email or CSV with two-factor authentication; SSO, directory sync and hardware keys are basic or not described.

5 — SSO with named identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google), SCIM or directory sync for provisioning and deprovisioning, and MFA including FIDO2 or hardware keys.

8 — The SSO unlock documented with how the vault key is derived or released and designed so the vendor cannot derive it, group sync driving vault permissions, automated suspension on deprovisioning, conditional access or device policies, and passkeys stored and used across platforms.

10 — Identity is integrated without trust shortcuts: the SSO key model published and independently reviewed, deprovisioning that revokes vault access and shared items immediately with a log entry, passwordless vault unlock with passkeys, and support for the customer's own key-management or trusted-device approval.

Report an error

The Skeptic

SAML single sign-on is documented with a long list of named providers including Microsoft Entra ID, Okta and Google, an enforced SSO-only mode with an emergency local sign-in exception, single log-out, and AD/LDAP directory import whose synchronized user and role changes can be auto-applied or admin-approved; MFA covers authenticator apps and YubiKey with an admin-controllable two-week browser bypass cookie. I found no public information on SCIM provisioning, how the vault key is derived or released when signing in through a provider, or passkey support. 2 6 7 9

Report an error

Audit logs, policies & reporting

How this is scored

What an administrator and an auditor can see and enforce: event logs of access and changes, password health and breach reports, enforceable policies (master password, MFA, sharing, export), SIEM integration, and reports an ISO 27001 or NIS2 audit can use.

0 — No administration by the vendor's own description: a personal tool with no admin console, logs or policies.

3 — An admin console with an activity list and a password health or strength report; exportable logs and enforceable policies are basic or not described.

5 — Event logs covering logins, item access, sharing and admin changes, enforceable policies for master password and MFA, and password health and breach-monitoring reports.

8 — Logs exportable or available through an API with native SIEM integration to named targets (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic or syslog), policies for sharing, export and browser-extension behaviour, log retention stated, and compliance reports aligned to ISO 27001, NIS2 or BSI IT-Grundschutz.

10 — Auditability is complete: every view, copy, autofill and permission change logged with user and device, logs tamper-evident and retained for a configurable period, alerting on anomalous access, and an auditor role that can read logs without access to secrets.

Report an error

The Skeptic

The event catalog is unusually granular — password fetched, offline sync, access added/deleted/expired, inheritance blocked, session and admin-setting changes — with individually toggleable events, export to CSV and JSON carrying who/what/when/status/IP, syslog support, and enforceable policies for password rules, MFA, lockouts with alerts, timeouts and inactivity locks pushed through client configuration. I found no public information on log retention periods, password health or breach-monitoring reports, or SIEM targets beyond syslog. 8 9

Report an error

Hosting choice, offline access & export

How this is scored

Where and how the vault runs and how the data leaves it: cloud region choice, a self-hosted or on-premises option, offline access during a vendor outage, client coverage across operating systems and browsers, and a complete, documented export and import path.

0 — Vault data cannot leave the product: the vendor states that no export is offered.

3 — Apps for common platforms and browsers and an export of vault items (for example CSV); hosting region, offline access and export completeness are basic or not described.

5 — Clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, Android and the major browsers, offline access to the vault, an EU region or self-hosted option, and export and import of vault data including from named competitors.

8 — Both EU cloud and self-hosted or on-premises deployment documented, Linux clients, a status page with incident history, an encrypted full-fidelity export covering all item types including attachments, and vault access continuing during an outage of the vendor's service.

10 — The customer can run and leave the vault on their own terms: self-hosting with documented high availability and backup, an open or documented export format that preserves structure, permissions and history, and a stated procedure for continued access if the vendor ends the service.

Report an error

The Skeptic

The product is self-hosted on the customer's own Windows Server, locally or on any cloud host such as Azure, AWS or RackSpace, with no functional difference and a vendor recommendation of local hosting for full control of data; offline caching is evidenced in the audit events and import covers roughly 45 formats including KeePass, Chrome and generic CSV. I found no public information on a documented full-fidelity export path, Linux clients, or a status page with incident history, and the captured pages name only the Windows KeePass desktop client with mobile and browser clients mentioned in passing. 1 8 10 11

Report an error

European sovereignty

How this is scored

Who the contracting entity and the parent company are, where vault data and metadata are hosted, and who the subprocessors are. Independently sourced by the sovereignty pipeline; end-to-end encryption narrows what a foreign authority could compel, but metadata, logs and the update channel for the client software remain in the vendor's hands, so the chain still counts.

0 — Proven non-EU on every dimension the evidence covers: non-EU vendor and contracting entity and non-EU hosting, with no EU or self-hosted option stated.

3 — One European element proven: an EU data region, an EU contracting entity or EU representative, a self-hosted option, or a published DPA, with the rest of the chain unstated.

5 — EU hosting as standard or selectable, or a self-hosted option, and an EU contracting entity or EU representative, with a DPA offered; the parent company or parts of the chain (support, analytics, email, client distribution) are unstated or non-EU.

8 — EU hosting on named infrastructure, EU contracting entity, subprocessor list published with locations, a DPA covering vault metadata and logs, and a self-hosted option that removes the vendor from the data path.

10 — Sovereign end to end and evidenced: European ownership, entity, hosting and every subprocessor, certifications published (ISO 27001, BSI C5 or equivalent), and source code or builds verifiable so the client update channel is not a blind trust in the vendor.

Report an error

The Skeptic

The one proven element is self-hosting: the customer installs on their own server, locally or on a cloud host of their choice, which the vendor recommends for full control of the data, and no vendor-run region of any kind is described. The contracting entity's jurisdiction, vendor-side data residency, subprocessors, a DPA and any transfer impact assessment are unknown to me from the captured pages — the GDPR mention sits in a homepage list of supported compliance standards rather than a published agreement. 1 11

Report an error

Pricing transparency not rated — the vendor publishes no price

How this is scored

Whether a buyer can compute the real annual cost from public pages alone: price per user and tier, which features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM, self-hosting) sit in which tier, minimum seats, add-ons, and the minimum term.

0 — No public prices at all; every tier is a sales conversation.

3 — A public "from" price or one priced tier, per user or flat.

5 — Per-user prices public for the business tiers with the billing period stated and the main features per tier listed.

8 — Every tier priced publicly with its feature set and seat minimum, add-on prices listed, self-hosted licensing stated, minimum term and VAT treatment given.

10 — Complete price computability: annual invoice derivable for a given number of users, with every add-on, self-hosting licence, support level and renewal condition published.

Report an error

The Skeptic not rated — no public information

I found no public information on pricing: none of the captured pages, including the homepage, shows a price, a tier list or seat minimums, and the only licensing fact is that a valid license is required whether the server is hosted locally or in the cloud. Edition names such as Enterprise+SSO appear throughout the documentation without any public price attached. 1 2 7 11

Report an error

European sovereignty — proven facts

1 of 6 dimensions proven

Built only from facts shown on the vendor's own pages. A dimension we could not prove is left open, not scored as zero.

Hosting location Not determined — uncited Report an error
Hosting options Self-hostable unverified
Why unverified?

The page describes the customer installing the product on their own Windows server (locally or on a cloud host), but never mentions a vendor-run EU region option.

1/1 pts 11 Report an error
Open source Not determined — uncited Report an error
Data processing agreement Not determined — uncited Report an error
Transfer impact assessment Not determined — uncited Report an error

Questions about Pleasant Password Server

Is Pleasant Password Server European?

Not determined: the vendor’s pages as captured do not say where Pleasant Password Server is based.

Where does Pleasant Password Server store data?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

Does Pleasant Password Server have a free plan?

Not stated on the vendor’s pages as of 17 Nov 2026.

What are the best alternatives to Pleasant Password Server?

As of 18 Nov 2026, the panel rates Passbolt (3.5/5), Password Depot (3.5/5) and 1Password (3.5/5) highest among the other 30 Password Management products evaluated. Ratings that look equal are rounded to half stars; the order uses the unrounded rating, then the name. The highest-rated European alternative is Passbolt (EU-Made, Luxembourg). Ratings are the AI panel’s opinion, formed from public evidence: how scores are made. The full list, with European products first: Pleasant Password Server alternatives.

Where this could be wrong

What we left out

A claim that does not survive our checks costs us the claim, not the page. This is what was taken off this one.

Sources (11)

The pages every claim on this page was read from — each one checked, dated, and kept verifiable.

  1. 1 Vendor page www.pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  2. 2 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  3. 3 Encryption model & independent audits — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  4. 4 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  5. 5 Sharing, roles & recovery — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  6. 6 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  7. 7 SSO, directory sync & provisioning — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  8. 8 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  9. 9 Audit logs, policies & reporting — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  10. 10 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →
  11. 11 Hosting choice, offline access & export — found from sitemap pleasantpasswords.com Checked 17 Nov 2026 Details →